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INTRODUCTION
Americans are seeing race and sex differently these days, and the
workplace is no exception. Indeed, there is reason to believe that managers are
voluntarily and consciously considering the race and sex of employees in
everyday employment decisions organizing work: who will serve on a hiring or
recruitment committee, who will be assigned to which client or market, who
will be asked to sit for interviews or photographs for publicity materials.
These are all decisions about how and by whom work is accomplished—
decisions “organizing work”—rather than about who gains entry into a firm in
the first place or where someone is placed within a clearly defined job
hierarchy.
Many of us realize that these decisions are sometimes, even frequently,
based in part on race or sex. We would be surprised to see a law school
appointments committee comprised entirely of white men, even if most
members of the faculty are white men. Outside of the academy, moreover, the
“diversity” discourse popular in the business press presents diversity as a
business imperative.1 According to this discourse, valuing diversity and
having a diverse workforce are morally correct and make economic sense. By
attaining, valuing, and managing diversity, businesses can get ahead. They can
tap into increasingly globalized and diverse markets and gain the benefits of an
increasingly diverse national and international workforce. This value-added
case for diversity frames a particular narrative for managers regarding the
relevance of race and sex in decisions organizing work. According to that
narrative, race and sex are relevant as means of serving markets and of
signaling a firm’s commitment to diversity and its adherence to egalitarian
norms.
What we do not seem to realize is that race- and sex-based decisions
organizing work have enormous potential to generate (and to reduce)
workplace discrimination and inequality. Decisions organizing work present
1 See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC.
1589, 1590 (2001) (identifying a diversity rhetoric in managerial literature that “extols the virtues of a diverse
workforce and advocates ‘managing diversity’ and ‘valuing diversity’”); Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How
Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management: Employer Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to
1996, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 960, 972–73 (1998) (identifying a rise in “diversity management”). The
business case for diversity gained national prominence with the corporate amicus curiae briefs filed in Grutter
v. Bollinger, an equal protection case challenging the use of race in graduate school admissions. Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–31 (2003) (citing amicus briefs of 3M et al. and of General Motors Corp.); see
also infra notes 23–29 and accompanying text.
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and arrange workers in relation to one another and, accordingly, shape the
context for day-to-day intergroup interactions and relationships that are
established and carried out at work.2 Intergroup interactions, whether at the
water cooler or in the course of securing a lucrative business deal, can
reinforce stereotypes, or break them down. Social scientists have long
understood that people tend to categorize similarities and differences during
interaction as a way of making sense of each other3 and that the environmental
features, or context, of an interaction can affect the salience of race and gender
categories and can ultimately influence whether the interaction is stereotype
confirming or stereotype challenging.4
This and other research suggest that race- and sex-based decisions
organizing work made pursuant to the prevailing relevance narrative will
produce and further entrench workplace inequality.5 Not only are the decisions
themselves (often based on ideas about group differences) likely to perpetuate
stereotypes and to impose extra, “shadow” work on women and minorities, but
race- and sex-based decisions organizing work made pursuant to the dominant
narrative are also likely to create stratification in jobs and job functions and
lead to devaluation along racial and gender lines, conditions that have been
shown to foster stereotype-confirming interactions.6
At the same time, a substantial body of social science research and theory
points to race and sex in organizing work as potentially one of the most
effective, untapped ways of reducing workplace discrimination.7 Studies have

2 Decisions organizing work are decisions that determine who does what work once workers have been
included in the institution. Although decisions organizing work can take place simultaneously with entry and
promotion decisions, the decisions organizing work that I focus on in this Article allocate job functions,
responsibilities, and conditions within job categories. See Devon Carbado et al., After Inclusion, 4 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 83, 84 (2008) (recognizing that “although determining precisely what happens before and
during the moment in which a prospective employee is excluded from an employment opportunity remains
crucial to antidiscrimination theory and practice, employment scholars are beginning to pay more attention to
what happens to that person after she is hired and becomes an employee”).
3 See ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR (1967); Cecilia L.
Ridgeway, Interaction and the Conservation of Gender Inequality: Considering Employment, 62 AM. SOC.
REV. 218 (1997). This process of situating self and other through categorization continues throughout
interaction. See id. at 220.
4 GOFFMAN, supra note 3; Ridgeway, supra note 3; see also Barbara F. Reskin, Including Mechanisms
in Our Models of Ascriptive Inequality, 68 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (2003); Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Linking Social
Structure and Interpersonal Behavior: A Theoretical Perspective on Cultural Schemas and Social Relations,
69 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 5 (2006).
5 See infra Part I.A.
6 Id.
7 See infra Part I.B.
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shown, for example, that placing an African American on an otherwise allwhite interview panel can alter the deliberation among panel members and
reduce the likelihood that biases and stereotypes will negatively affect the
interaction between the panel members and African-American candidates.8
Additional research suggests that improving the racial and gender balance in
the work environment and expanding opportunities for peer-like contact and
collaboration among workers from different racial and gender groups can lead
to better career outcomes for women and people of color.9 It follows from this
research that considering race and sex when composing work teams can reduce
discriminatory biases and stereotyping in intergroup interaction by leading to
more integrated teams.
Legal scholars and antidiscrimination advocates alike have largely
overlooked the risks and possibilities of considering race and sex in organizing
work. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to how employment
discrimination law should treat race- and sex-based decisions made for
business reasons10—and none has been aimed at understanding the role of law,
8 See Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 844–47 (2001); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision
Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 597 (2006). See generally Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,
1175–77 (2008) (describing Sommers’s study and other research showing how perceptions of bias can
influence interaction).
9 See LAUREL SMITH-DOERR, WOMEN’S WORK: GENDER EQUALITY VS. HIERARCHY IN THE LIFE
SCIENCES (2004); Alexandra Kalev, Cracking the Glass Cages? Restructuring and Ascriptive Inequality at
Work, 114 AM. J. SOC. 1591 (2009).
10 Much of the scholarship considering the law’s role in regulating race- and sex-based decisions has
focused on the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger for the use of race in
employers’ hiring decisions. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration,
and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2005); Paul Frymer & John D.
Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36
CONN. L. REV. 677 (2004); Ronald Turner, Grutter, the Diversity Justification, and Workplace Affirmative
Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 199 (2004).
This scholarship tends to coalesce around two largely competing views. One sees the ascendance of
the business case for diversity as an “echo” of largely discredited market-based arguments and cautions against
a regulatory model that would allow employers more freedom to make consciously race- or sex-based
employment decisions. See, e.g., Frymer & Skrentny, supra (drawing parallels between the “instrumental
affirmative action” logic of Grutter and bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) logic). The other sees
the ascendance of the business case for diversity, and the Supreme Court’s favorable nod in Grutter v.
Bollinger, as offering a welcome opening for greater legal deference to the conscious use of race and sex in
employment decisions. See, e.g., Turner, supra, at 232–36 (arguing that Grutter creates room for race- and
sex-based decisions to serve business interests in diversity); Rebecca Hanner White, Affirmative Action in the
Workplace: The Significance of Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263 (2003) (suggesting that Grutter presents
opportunities for deference to an employer’s consideration of race and sex pursuant to a diversity rationale,
despite the narrow BFOQ defense for sex and lack of BFOQ defense for race).
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particularly the most far-reaching employment discrimination statute, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act,11 in regulating consideration of race and sex in
decisions organizing work.12
This lack of critical examination of the permissibility of considering race
and sex in decisions organizing work is even more striking because decisions
organizing work differ from entry, promotion, and exit decisions in ways that
are important to an antidiscrimination analysis. They are “softer” in that their
benefits and harms are not always immediately discernable. Indeed, the
benefits of decisions organizing work for those whose work is being organized
are often not discernable without reference to relations, such as the opportunity
to impress others or to overcome stereotypes. Moreover, unlike race- and sexbased decisions at key employment junctures like hiring or promotion, the use
of race and sex in organizing work can impose tangible, work-related costs on
individual women and members of minority groups, even when it is intended
to further a nondiscrimination goal. A woman who is assigned to a hiring
committee because her presence will help minimize gender stereotyping, for
example, may bear a cost in the form of additional work that goes
uncompensated by the firm. Even if she is financially compensated for the
work, the assignment may hinder her career advancement by taking time and
energy away from other work-related, career-building tasks.
From a political perspective, because the benefits and harms of race- and
sex-based decisions in organizing work are often “softer” and more difficult to
discern, considering race and sex in organizing work may prove a more
effective tool for reducing discrimination—and ultimately advancing social
equality—than considering race and sex at more traditional, exhaustively

I argue in this Article that Title VII—at least for decisions organizing work—offers an untapped
regulatory middle ground, an opportunity to reframe the narrative guiding the use of race and sex in decisions
organizing work to foster workplace integration and reduced discrimination. Cf. Estlund, supra, at 31, 35–36
(recognizing the “tension” between an interpretation of Title VII that permits “pro-integration preferences” and
the business case for diversity as justification for preferences and proposing an approach that “skirts” that
problem by providing employers deference when they seek to address a “‘manifest imbalance’ in a
predominately white workplace or job”).
11 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.L. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (2006)).
12 Several scholars have argued in favor of a non-remedial justification for race- and sex-based decisions
at moments of hiring, discharge, and promotion. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A
Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1111–15 (2006) (arguing that
hiring “debiasing agents” is permissible under the Constitution and Title VII); Michael J. Yelnosky, The
Prevention Justification for Affirmative Action, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385 (2003) (arguing for a “prevention
justification” under Title VII).
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contested moments of employment decision like hiring, discharge, or
promotion. Developing Title VII as it applies to decisions organizing work
cannot entirely sidestep the debate surrounding affirmative action, but it does
offer a new, promising avenue for change.
This Article provides the first extended analysis of the conscious
consideration of race and sex in organizing work. It draws on research and
literature in the fields of sociology, social psychology, and organizational
theory to expose the risks and possibilities of permitting race- and sex-based
decisions organizing work for workplace equality. Based on this empirical
foundation and on established Supreme Court case law setting limits and
conditions on the use of race and sex in employment decisions under Title VII,
the Article presents an argument that is equally normative and doctrinal. It
argues that Title VII permits (and should permit) the use of race and sex in
decisions organizing work as a means of reducing workplace discrimination,
although not as a means of serving business interests alone, and that Title VII
requires (and should require) that those race- or sex-based decisions be part of
an employer’s broader integrative effort, an effort comprised of various
structural reforms that are likely to foster functional integration and reduce
workplace discrimination. This approach to the voluntary, conscious use of
race and sex in organizing work adheres to the statutory goals of Title VII by
limiting the scope of permissible justifications for race- and sex-based decision
making and also by requiring a link between decisions that impose race- or
sex-based costs on individual employees and furtherance of the statute’s
broader goals.
This interpretation of Title VII offers a unique opportunity to harness the
popular business incentives for taking race and sex into account in organizing
work to progress meaningful workplace integration and reduce discrimination.
To the extent that considering race or sex in organizing work for prevailing
business reasons overlaps with considering race and sex as a discriminationreducing measure, this interpretation of Title VII creates an incentive for
employers to undertake integrative efforts. At the same time, the interpretation
reshapes the narrative regarding the relevance of race and sex in organizing
work to emphasize functional integration; race and sex become relevant in
decisions organizing work as means of facilitating stereotype- and biaschallenging intergroup interaction and as means of fostering work cultures in
which workers are valued for individual contributions rather than for expected
group differences.
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In addition to providing a much-needed critical analysis of the
permissibility of race and sex in organizing work and offering an opening for
Title VII law to facilitate workplace integration, this Article advances a larger
theoretical goal. It seeks to broaden the shift in emphasis from individuals to
structural and systemic change that is currently underway in the legal
scholarship13 to include an understanding of the role that social interactions
play in producing and reproducing disadvantage at work. Existing focus has
been on reducing cognitive and motivational biases in key decision makers.14
This Article attends more closely to biases as they operate in social relations.15
Several important advantages inure from this theoretical move. One, of
course, is accuracy. In the tradition of behavioral realism, this Article takes the
position that accurately conceptualizing discrimination as it operates in the
workplace (and elsewhere) is a crucial first step to devising effective avenues
for change.16 Conceptualizing discrimination with a relational component
makes it easier to see that discrimination is often not the product of a single
individual acting in isolation but rather of multiple people acting in concert,17
13 It is becoming increasingly clear that employment discrimination law, to be effective, must focus more
on structural and systemic change over the “ex post facto identification of specific instances of
discrimination.” Susan T. Fiske & Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Policy Implications of Unexamined
Discrimination: Gender Bias in Employment as a Case Study, in BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY
(Eldar Shafir ed., forthcoming). Proponents of a “structuralist” move in employment discrimination law, who
include social scientists as well as legal scholars, argue that the organizational and institutional conditions that
facilitate workplace discrimination warrant greater regulatory attention. See Robert L. Nelson et al., Divergent
Paths: Conflicting Conceptions of Employment Discrimination in Law and the Social Sciences, 4 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 103, 109 (2008) (“The narrowing of employment discrimination law and focus on individualized
claims of discrimination stand in stark contrast to sociological research, which locates discrimination in the
structure of employment and the workplace.”). See generally Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as
Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 857–65 (2007) (describing a
structural approach to employment discrimination law).
14 See Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the Relational Level,
59 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (2008) (arguing that efforts to devise discrimination-reducing measures have focused
too narrowly at the individual level and should be expanded to include the relational level of discrimination).
15 Instead of drawing principally on the research and literature on implicit biases, which tends to
emphasize individual mindsets, I build the empirical foundation for this Article more directly from research
and theory in the fields of sociology, organizational theory, and new institutionalism. These disciplines
emphasize structure and systems at the same time that they conceptualize discrimination—and regulation—to
include processes of social interaction. See generally CHARLES TILLY, DURABLE INEQUALITY (1998) (urging
emphasis on transactions and social relations over individualism).
16 Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law:
Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 997–1002 (2006) (describing behavioral
realism).
17 These actors include members of groups whose subordination the law seeks to combat. Attending to
relations in employment discrimination law requires therefore that we develop both a better understanding of
women and people of color as more than passive victims as well as a better understanding of how behavioral

GREEN GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

6/10/2010 1:49 PM

RACE AND SEX IN ORGANIZING WORK

593

and that race and gender are actively constructed and negotiated in interactions
at work.18
Attending to relations also uncovers the interconnectedness of various
structural mechanisms for change and reveals the importance of narrative and
ideology to guide the implementation of reform in organizations. Attending to
relations shows, for example, that altering organizational structures to motivate
individuals to correct for their biases at moments of key decision making will
be insufficient as an equality measure if interaction between members of
different groups reinforces stereotypes and biases leading up to those
decisions; nor will increasing the numbers of women and minorities in a
particular job category be sufficient if day-to-day relations produce and
reproduce bias in ways that result in social closure.19 Similarly, structural
changes at the policy level of an organization are unlikely to have much
meaningful effect on discrimination and inequality in the workplace if the
dominant narrative regarding the relevance of race and sex to work and work
assignments perpetuates biases in relations between workers.20
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I sets the empirical groundwork
for an approach to race and sex in organizing work that is cognizant of
business interests but that does not defer entirely to the use of race and sex in
pursuit of those interests. I briefly summarize some of the sociolegal literature
uncovering the value-added case for diversity that is likely to guide current
consideration of race and sex in organizing work, and I examine the likely
effects of race- and sex-based decisions made pursuant to that case. I argue
expectations can be discriminatory. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Interactions at Work:
Remembering David Charny, 17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 13, 18 (2001).
18 See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds.,
2d ed. 2000); Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). Attending to relations brings into focus the
interpersonal ways in which race and gender are constructed on a daily basis. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu
Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1760–61 (2003) (book review)
(describing “race-producing practices” at the micro level).
19 See, e.g., VINCENT J. ROSCIGNO, THE FACE OF DISCRIMINATION: HOW RACE AND GENDER IMPACT
WORK AND HOME LIVES (2007) (using cases from the Ohio Civil Rights Commission to uncover the social
processes of discrimination and arguing that sociologists tend to focus on structures to the neglect of social
interaction, the “face” of discrimination).
20 Instead, research suggests that without attention to relations, changes at the policy level can become
“decoupled” from day-to-day processes of discrimination. THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and
Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992); John W.
Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J.
SOC. 340 (1977).
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that the narrative that emerges from the business case for diversity regarding
the relevance of race and sex in organizing work is likely to produce race- and
sex-based decisions that entrench rather than destabilize inequality. I then
present research showing that consideration of race and sex in organizing work
can serve as an important discrimination-reducing measure, particularly when
individual race- and sex-based decisions are part of a broader program of
systemic reforms aimed at increasing opportunities for cross-boundary, peerlike interaction and collaboration. Attention to race and sex in organizing
work can help shift the demographic and power imbalances that facilitate
biases in relations between workers; it can foster work environments that
produce stereotype-challenging rather than stereotype-reinforcing intergroup
interactions.
In this Part, I also consider whether and to what extent race- and sex-based
decisions organizing work will fall beneath the radar of Title VII. I argue that,
despite several doctrinal and practical hurdles, decisions organizing work are
unlikely to be fully insulated from Title VII challenge. Moreover, I argue that
it would be unwise to seek to insulate race- and sex-based decisions organizing
work from Title VII inquiry.
In Part II, I apply Title VII to decisions organizing work and argue for an
interpretation of Title VII that permits consideration of race and sex in
decisions organizing work but that requires that race- and sex-based decisions
be tied to the statute’s broader nondiscrimination goals. Specifically, I make
the following three principal claims: (1) Title VII permits consideration of race
and sex in organizing work to further the goal of reducing workplace
discrimination, but not to further business interests alone; (2) Title VII requires
a link between any individual decision considering race or sex and furtherance
of the broader nondiscrimination goals of Title VII (a “micro–macro” link);
and (3) the micro–macro link is established when a race- or sex-based decision
organizing work is part of an employer’s systemic effort to foster functional,
discrimination-reducing integration within its workplace.
Part III considers possibilities and addresses anticipated concerns,
including concerns about the practical difficulties in monitoring employers’
integrative efforts and about the effect of a reshaped narrative regarding the
relevance of race and sex in decisions organizing work on social equality
goals.
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I. RACE- AND SEX-BASED DECISIONS ORGANIZING WORK
In this Part, I consider how race and sex are likely being considered in
decisions organizing work and how they might be considered. According to
the narrative that emerges from the business case for diversity, race and sex are
relevant in decisions organizing work primarily as means of serving particular
markets and of signaling adherence to egalitarian norms and compliance with
the law. Decisions made pursuant to this narrative are likely to perpetuate
stereotypes and to entrench workplace inequality. Research also suggests,
however, that considering race and sex in organizing work can serve as an
important discrimination-reducing measure.
A. Race and Sex in Organizing Work Pursuant to the Prevailing Narrative
There are several reasons to believe that race and sex are being considered
in decisions organizing work. Decisions organizing work—much more so than
decisions about who should be hired in the first place or even who should be
awarded a promotion—are based on perceptions arising out of day-to-day
interactions. In most workplaces, those interactions are likely to be both laden
with stereotypes and stereotype reinforcing.21 The substantial literature on the
operation of cognitive and motivational biases confirms this basic point and
suggests that biases are prevalent and likely to infect decisions organizing
work.22
The narrative concerning the relevance of race and sex that emerges from
the prevailing business case for diversity, however, suggests that race and sex
are being taken into account in organizing work not just in the form of implicit
biases but also in the form of consciously considered factors. The business
case for diversity that surfaced in the professional managerial literature in the
mid-1980s gained substantial ground in the early 1990s.23 Research by
sociologist Frank Dobbin suggests that the business case for diversity emerged
in part as a response by professionals in personnel management to Reagan-era
21 See infra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (describing the effects of stratification on stereotypes
and biases in interaction).
22 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (detailing studies showing
the role of cognitive biases in subjective, multi-factored decisions).
23 See Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1609–15 (documenting the rise and progression of diversity
rhetoric in the professional management literature); Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 1, at 971–78 (crediting the
rise of business-based arguments for diversity from 1988 to 1996 to EEO managers and management
consultants).
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cuts in enforcement of antidiscrimination law and opposition to affirmative
action and that it was buttressed by beliefs about globalization and about the
changing nature of the entry-level American workforce.24 According to the
business case for diversity, sometimes called the case for “diversity
management,” a diverse workforce is a resource—a way of getting ahead—and
a business imperative.
Diversity (and managing diversity) allows
organizations to better reach and serve an increasingly diverse and globalized
market and to benefit from an increasingly diverse and globalized workforce.25
Although researchers have yet to pinpoint the precise extent to which the
business case for diversity has caught on within firms, studies do suggest a
shift in organizational approaches toward diversity that is consistent with the
rise of diversity management rhetoric in the business literature. Researchers
have documented, for example, a shift toward diversity management in
business schools and human resource programs and have documented the
adoption of diversity rhetoric by particular firms.26 Over the past several
decades, moreover, private firms have adopted an array of practices aimed at
managing diversity, including diversity committees and taskforces, diversity

24 FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 133–60 (2009) (tying the “Reagan Revolution” to
the rise of diversity management); Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 1, at 967 (“Reagan curtailed administrative
enforcement of EEO and AA dramatically and appointed federal judges opposed to regulation in general and
to affirmative action in particular. These changes appeared to threaten the EEO/AA system hashed out in the
1970s. EEO/AA specialists responded by developing efficiency arguments for their programs.”). Researchers
also trace a rise in diversity management to misinterpretation of a report issued in 1987 by the Secretary of
Labor, “which carried the message that white men would make up little of the twenty-first century workforce.”
DOBBIN, supra, at 159; see also Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1614.
25 See Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1618–19 (describing the “prominent themes” in diversity
literature); Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 1, at 973–75.
26 DOBBIN, supra note 24, at 142 (describing changes in business schools and national conferences
devoted to diversity management); Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 1, at 977–78 (describing changes toward
diversity management in rhetoric and focus of specialists and business groups); see also David A. Thomas &
Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–
Oct. 1996, at 79, 83 (describing a managerial sense in some firms that a diverse workforce is needed to
“understand and serve [their] customers better and to gain legitimacy with them”). The “value-added” model
for framing diversity documented in some firms is also consistent with the view that the business case for
diversity has been accepted by businesses, even as the model may alienate minorities and derail other diversity
initiatives. See Victoria C. Plaut, Cultural Models of Diversity in America: The Psychology of Difference and
Inclusion, in ENGAGING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL
DEMOCRACIES 365 (Richard A. Shweder et al. eds., 2002) (identifying the “value-added” model); Flannery G.
Stevens et al., Unlocking the Benefits of Diversity: All-Inclusive Multiculturalism and Positive Organizational
Change, 44 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 116 (2008) (assessing limitations of the multiculturalism and
colorblindness models of diversity adopted by organizations).
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training, and diversity evaluations of managers.27 This sense that the business
case for diversity has been accepted by organizations is also reflected in the
amicus curiae briefs submitted by major corporations in favor of affirmative
action in higher education in the Supreme Court case, Grutter v. Bollinger.28
The corporations emphasized in their briefs that diversity at all levels of their
workforces is crucial to serving an increasingly international market and to
reaching specific racial and cultural communities.29
Managers who make day-to-day employment decisions, including
decisions organizing work, do so within this organizational frame. A diverse
workforce is “valued” according to this frame, and race and sex may therefore
be considered relevant to hiring, firing, and promotion decisions as means of
creating and maintaining a diverse workforce.30 But integration and intergroup
27 See Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate
Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589, 590 (2006) (examining the effects of seven
common diversity programs—affirmative action plans, diversity committees and taskforces, diversity
managers, diversity training, diversity evaluations for managers, networking programs, and mentoring
programs—on the representation of protected groups in management at private firms).
28 Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 13–14, 17, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02–241), 2003 WL 399096 [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief of General
Motors Corp.] (arguing that managers and employees from diverse backgrounds can translate their crosscultural understandings to “creative product development, community outreach, and marketing and advertising
campaigns” while “engag[ing] daily in transnational, cross-cultural, and interracial contacts”); Brief for Amici
Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of Respondents at 7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02–241), 2003 WL 399056 (explaining that diverse employees “are better able to develop
products and services that appeal to a variety of consumers and to market offerings in ways that appeal to those
consumers”); Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae Out of Time and Brief of MTV Networks in
Support of Respondents at 2–3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02–241), 2003 WL 1785765
[hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief of MTV Networks] (“[A] diverse workforce is critical to the development
and marketing of programming targeted to specific racial and cultural communities . . . .”). The briefs also
emphasize the importance of obtaining employees who have experience with diversity or “cross-cultural
competence.” See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of General Motors Corp., supra, at 4.
Although the narrative as currently framed by the business case for diversity focuses on race and sex as
means of serving diverse markets and signaling adherence to egalitarian norms, some of the corporate briefs
were quite aspirational in their arguments regarding the need for cross-cultural competence. See id. Those
aspirations are consistent with integrative efforts in employment, even if they are not now resulting in
decisions organizing work that facilitate meaningful integration. See infra notes 102 & 173 and accompanying
text.
29 Amicus Curiae Brief of General Motors Corp., supra note 28, at 13–14; Amicus Curiae Brief of MTV
Networks, supra note 28, at 2–3.
30 That race and sex might be considered as a way of attaining or maintaining diversity is consistent with
Professor Dobbin’s research showing that “diversity management” evolved from affirmative action measures,
but his research also shows that the “diversity” practices promoted under diversity management tend not to
include preferences for women or minorities. DOBBIN, supra note 25, at 101–32; Kelly & Dobbin, supra note
1, at 978–81. Other research suggests that these diversity practices, including diversity training, are largely
ineffective equality measures. See Kalev et al., supra note 27.
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equality are not dominant themes of the business case for diversity.31 For
decisions organizing work, therefore, the business case for diversity translates
into a thin narrative regarding the relevance of race and sex: Race and sex are
relevant primarily as means of serving markets and of signaling commitment to
diversity and adherence to egalitarian norms and laws.
And, although it is possible that race- and sex-based decisions made
pursuant to the business case for diversity at moments of entry, promotion, and
exit will result in more diverse workforces overall,32 race- and sex-based
decisions made pursuant to the business case for diversity at the level of
organizing work are likely to entrench rather than destabilize inequality in
organizations. As should be relatively obvious from the description above,
race- and sex-based decisions organizing work pursuant to the “service” prong
of the prevailing narrative are likely to be based on and to perpetuate
stereotypes about group difference.33 Moreover, race- and sex-matching is
likely to lead to stratification within workforces as women and minorities
become pigeonholed in certain jobs or job functions34 and as those jobs or
functions labeled “female” or “minority” are devalued.35
The stratification that results from these race- and sex-based decisions
organizing work is also likely to further entrench workplace inequality by
setting a particular context for intergroup interaction. The segregated, low
status of women’s and minorities’ jobs and job functions is likely to activate
gender and racial stereotypes and biases in interaction between workers across
and within jobs.36 A range of studies in social psychology and sociology
confirms that status and power differentials lead to greater reliance on

31 See Frank Linnehan & Alison M. Konrad, Diluting Diversity: Implications for Intergroup Inequality in
Organizations, 8 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 399 (1999) (critiquing the diversity management literature for failure to
emphasize intergroup inequality).
32 When race or sex are considered as conscious factors in entry, promotion, or exit decisions, they are
more likely to take the form of “preferences” for women and people of color. See Estlund, supra note 10, at 3.
33 See Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational Determinants of Law Firm Integration, 46 AM. U. L. REV.
669, 743 (1997) (noting that the “identification of minority lawyers with minority clients may . . . become
problematic . . . by increasing ethnic segmentation within the firms”); David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is
Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and
the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1594–97 (2004). See generally Barbara F.
Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 321 (2000).
34 See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 33, at 1594–95 (describing difficulty for black lawyers seeking to
specialize in practice areas in which being black is not seen as providing added value).
35 DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, GENDER & RACIAL INTEGRATION AT WORK: THE SOURCES &
CONSEQUENCES OF JOB SEGREGATION 3 (1993).
36 Reskin, supra note 33, at 325.
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stereotypes.37 Men and women are more likely, for example, to enact gendertypical behavior during interactions in which men are perceived as having
higher organizational status. Men are more likely in these circumstances to
interrupt in conversation, and women are more likely to qualify their
statements.38 Just as the patrimonial relationships between female secretaries
and their male bosses described in Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s famous
ethnography of the 1970s corporation worked so starkly to the disadvantage of
women, so, too, the intergroup interactions carried out in modern workplaces
in which women and minorities are segregated along racial and gender lines
are likely to perpetuate stereotypes and disadvantage.39
Race- and sex-based decisions organizing work made pursuant to the
“signaling” prong of the prevailing narrative (signaling commitment to
diversity and adherence to egalitarian norms and laws) are also likely to
negatively affect the overall job successes of women and minorities, even if the
decisions do not pigeonhole workers into particular job categories or
perpetuate stereotypes regarding group difference. Singling women and
minorities out for signaling work may generate or exacerbate feelings of
exploitation and isolation reported by women and people of color in male- and
white-dominated workplaces.40 At the same time, the decisions can generate
feelings of resentment among white men, who are likely to believe that race or
sex always plays a role when a woman or person of color is placed on a
prestigious committee or team or is assigned to a potentially lucrative client.41

37 See generally Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Lynn Smith-Lovin, The Gender System and Interaction, 25 ANN.
REV. SOC. 191 (1999) (describing and developing expectation states theory, which holds that men and women
recreate the gender system when they interact in a context of structural inequality); Don Operario & Susan T.
Fiske, Racism Equals Power Plus Prejudice: A Social Psychological Equation for Racial Oppression, in
CONFRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 33, 34–35 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske
eds., 1998) (discussing the influence of power on stereotypic thinking and perceived intergroup differences).
38 Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, supra note 37, at 202. Studies suggest similar dynamics in mixed-race
interactions. See Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation Processes: The SelfFulfilling Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 541 (1997)
(showing that people are likely to stereotype when interacting with people of a different race).
39 ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 72–87 (1977) (describing
relationships between male bosses and their female secretaries in the 1970s and the ways in which those
relationships disadvantaged women).
40 See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 33, at 1597–98 (“Blacks who feel that they are being pressed into service
solely because of their race frequently come away from such encounters feeling devalued and exploited.”).
The dominant narrative also leads to an erroneous conception that race is relevant in organizing work only for
non-whites. See infra Part III.B (discussing possibilities of a reshaped narrative).
41 See, e.g., Faye Crosby & Susan Clayton, Affirmative Action and the Issue of Expectancies, 46 J. SOC.
ISSUES 61, 66–68 (1990) (“The mere existence of an affirmative action program may reinforce existing
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In addition, race- and sex-based decisions organizing work can
disadvantage women and minorities by imposing extra work on members of
those groups. Imagine a law school, for example, at which women and
minority professors are asked to attend more student recruitment functions,
pose for more pictures and answer more media inquiries, and serve on more
faculty panels. Even if the dean makes these requests with laudable goals in
mind (for example, as a way of increasing student diversity or fostering alumni
involvement), the women and people of color who are asked to do this extra
work may suffer real job-related consequences. Time spent recruiting students
and talking to the media, after all, is time spent away from other careerbuilding work. Similar effects are likely to carry over into non-academic
settings.42 Because the dominant narrative suggests that considering race and
sex is justified by business interests, including the interest in signaling,
employers are unlikely to consider costs imposed by race- and sex-based
decisions, whether as a basis for financial compensation or otherwise.43
B. Race and Sex in Organizing Work Pursuant to an Integration Narrative
Not all consideration of race and sex in decisions organizing work is
counterproductive to achieving equality at work. A vast and growing body of
social science and organizational theory shows that attention to race and sex in
decisions organizing work has the potential to act as an important
discrimination-reducing measure by altering the structure and context of
workplace relations.
Specifically, race- and sex-conscious decisions
organizing work can create opportunities for more peer-like, cross-boundary,
collaborative work and can generally facilitate an integrated work environment
that is likely to reduce biases and stereotyping in interaction.44

stereotypes about minority group members and White women, which hold that the targeted groups are not
really qualified for certain positions and could not have obtained them in the absence of affirmative action.”).
42 See generally John D. Skrentny, Are America’s Civil Rights Laws Still Relevant?, 4 DU BOIS REV. 119
(2007). One African-American law professor related to me his experience of being assigned to the hiring
committee as an associate at a law firm and then being criticized for low billable hours the month the firm sent
him out of state to recruit.
43 Indeed, women and people of color might be expected to undertake this extra “diversity” work in
exchange for being hired. Catherine Fisk, Presentation at Employment and Labor Law Colloquium, San Diego
(Oct. 2008).
44 The argument in this section builds on an article written by sociologist Alexandra Kalev and me in
which we present research showing that bias and stereotypes are executed and reinforced in day-to-day
interactions and argue that employers can reduce discrimination by organizing work in ways that change the
context of workplace relations. See Green & Kalev, supra note 15, at 1445–53.
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Racial and gender integration in work has long been understood to reduce
discrimination. The effects of “tokenism” are now well known: Women and
minorities are less likely to be the subject of stereotyping and more likely to be
valued for their individual contributions if they are one among several of their
socially salient group than if they are one among none or few.45 But research
also shows that interaction between members of different groups (and not just
evaluation of women and minorities by men and whites) is directed away from
rather than toward discrimination by demographic diversity. Women and
minorities working in settings where there is a “critical mass” of members of
their group are likely to perceive less bias from others.46 The reduced salience
of minority-group status in integrated groups also eases pressure to conform
and reduces feelings of isolation and inferiority that can develop in skewed
environments.47
More broadly, integration in work can reduce workplace discrimination by
breaking down status and power differentials.48 Just as segregation in jobs and
job functions can lead to devaluation of those jobs or functions that are labeled
“female” or “minority”49 and can serve to activate gender and racial
stereotypes and biases,50 conditions of integration in work in which status
differentials are less salient can lead to lower levels of stereotyping and bias in
intergroup interaction.51 This basic point is consistent with longstanding
research on the contact hypothesis: The positive effects of intergroup contact

45 KANTER, supra note 39, at 221–22; Krieger, supra note 22, at 1193 (reviewing studies on the cognitive
bases of tokenism); Barbara M. Reskin et al., The Determinants and Consequences of Workplace Sex and Race
Composition, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 335, 348–55 (1999) (discussing the effect of workplace demographics on
stereotyping). Kanter argues that representation of less than fifteen percent of the relevant population creates
“skewed groups” and the detrimental effects of tokenism. See KANTER, supra note 39, at 208–12.
46 See generally Robinson, supra note 8 (examining research on the perception of bias on the part of
women and people of color, both widely and in more specific contexts, and the effect of that perception on
interaction).
47 KANTER, supra note 39, at 248–49 (noting that people whose type is present in small numbers tend to
be more visible, feel pressure to conform, often try to become invisible, find it hard to gain credibility, feel
isolated and peripheral, can be excluded from informal peer networks, have fewer opportunities to be
sponsored, face stress, and are often stereotyped).
48 See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, supra note 37; see also Green & Kalev, supra note 15, at 1447 (describing
several lines of research that support this point).
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are enhanced when interaction takes place in pursuit of common goals and
under conditions of equal status and institutional support.52
Recent research in the employment context also suggests that integrated
work teams in which peer-like collaboration is encouraged can reduce
discrimination and lead to better career outcomes for women and minorities.
In one study of the careers of women scientists, sociologist Laurel Smith-Doerr
found that women who worked in bio-technology firms, where scientists tend
to interact on collaborative projects and are rewarded as a group and evaluated
by their peers, were significantly more likely to attain supervisory positions
than women who worked in academia, where scientists tend to adhere to rigid
job categories, individual reward structures, and hierarchies.53
Smith-Doerr’s findings are consistent with a recent nationwide study of
firms conducted by sociologist Alexandra Kalev.54 Kalev found that women
and minorities were more likely to be promoted into the managerial ranks in
firms that adopted cross-boundary work teams—work teams that bring
together workers from different jobs on a regular basis to share information
and participate in decision making—than in firms that did not adopt those
types of teams.55 She also found that training programs that involved job
rotation led to greater success for women and minorities than programs that
focused on in-job training.56 As more organizations restructure work to be
team based, these findings become particularly important for the
discrimination-reducing potential of race and sex in organizing work.57

52 GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 281 (1954); Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R.
Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 758–61
(2006).
53 SMITH-DOERR, supra note 9; see also Kjersten Bunker Whittington & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Women
Inventors in Context: Disparities in Patenting Across Academia and Industry, 22 GENDER & SOC’Y 194, 194
(2008) (finding that women life scientists have higher patenting productivity in organizations with “networkbased organizational structures”).
54 Kalev, supra note 9, at 1608 (the study includes firms across nine industries).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 By 2002, between forty and eighty percent of medium and large American workplaces had adopted
self-directed work teams, problem-solving teams, cross-job training, or job training programs. See ARNE L.
KALLEBERG ET AL., ORGANIZATIONS IN AMERICA: ANALYZING THEIR STRUCTURES AND HUMAN RESOURCE
PRACTICES (1996); Paul Osterman, Work Reorganization in an Era of Restructuring: Trends in Diffusion and
Effects on Employee Welfare, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 179 (2000). For evidence that team-based work is
growing across sectors of the workforce, see Thomas Bailey et al., The Effect of High-Performance Work
Practices on Employee Earnings in the Steel, Apparel, and Medical Electronics and Imaging Industries, 54
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 525 (2001).
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Integrated decision-making committees can also reduce discrimination by
altering both the biases of committee members and the deliberative process of
the committee and by affecting the interaction between committee members
and applicants or other interviewees. Several studies have shown that whites
tend to exhibit less implicit racial bias on the Implicit Attitudes Test (IAT)
when they make decisions in the presence of an African American.58 Another
recent study compared the decision making of racially mixed and all-white
juries after they watched a video simulating the trial of a black defendant in a
criminal case.59 The researcher found that, even before deliberating, white
jurors were less likely to find the defendant guilty if they were members of a
racially mixed jury than if they were members of an all-white jury.60 During
deliberations, racially mixed juries also discussed more facts and corrected
more factual misstatements of fellow jurors than all-white juries.61
Interactions during interviews, too, are likely to be affected by the racial
and gender makeup of the interviewing committee. Studies reveal that
interviews in which the interviewer scores high in implicit bias are more
awkward—evinced by more speech errors, less eye contact, and more
distancing body language by both the interviewer and the interviewee—than
interviews in which the interviewer scores low in implicit bias.62 The studies
show that an interviewee is likely to replicate unfriendly behavior of an
interviewer so that the interaction as a whole is less positive.63 Because an
interview panel that is demographically diverse is less likely to be perceived as
biased, it is less likely to facilitate the operation of discriminatory stereotypes
and biases in the interview.64

This organizational move also poses the risk of entrenching and perpetuating inequality if it is not
accompanied by attention to biases in day-to-day decisions and interactions. See Tristin K. Green,
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 99–108 (2003) (describing some of the possible effects of reorganization toward
decentralized decision making and team-based work on workplace equality).
58 Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 844–47 (2001). See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit
Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 981–82 (2006) (listing additional studies).
59 See Sommers, supra note 8. See generally Robinson, supra note 8, at 1175–77 (describing Sommers’s
study).
60 Sommers, supra note 8, at 603.
61 Id. at 605.
62 Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory
Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 439–40 (2001).
63 See Chen & Bargh, supra note 38.
64 See Robinson, supra note 8, at 1171–73.

GREEN GALLEYSFINAL

604

6/10/2010 1:49 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

However, despite this research supporting the idea that integration in work
can reduce discrimination by expanding opportunities for peer-like contact,
collaboration, and decision making among workers from different racial and
gender groups, most workplaces remain highly segregated, with women and
people of color concentrated in the lower-level, less-valued jobs and job
functions.65 The smaller representation of many protected groups in the
working population as a whole also makes it difficult for these groups to attain
substantial numbers in each segment of a workforce. Without attention to race
or sex in organizing work, therefore, work teams and decision-making
committees drawn from all but the lowest-level jobs will only rarely be
diverse.66
Research also suggests that taking race or sex into account to alter the work
environment can reduce discrimination.67 A physically integrated workplace
can facilitate interaction and aid in the development of egalitarian norms.68
Taking race and sex into account in devising promotional materials and in
assigning clients or projects, provided that the materials and assignments are
publicized within the firm, can also help reduce discrimination, particularly in
conjunction with efforts to integrate work and decision-making bodies. This is
because valuing women and people of color as contributors can help instill
favorable work cultures and norms for reducing discrimination.69 And
assigning women and people of color to key, prestigious client bases can alter
the informal power structures that serve to entrench segregation.70
65 BARBARA F. RESKIN, THE REALITIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EMPLOYMENT 21 (1998);
TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 35; Barbara Reskin, Sex Segregation in the Workplace, 19 ANN. REV. SOC.
241, 246 (1993); Donald Tomaskovic-Devey et al., Documenting Desegregation: Segregation in American
Workplaces by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, 1966–2003, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 565 (2006).
66 This does not mean, of course, that members of different racial and gender groups do not interact; it
means only that their interactions take place in a context that is likely to reinforce biases and stereotypes rather
than break them down.
67 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 58, at 981 (describing studies on the effect of population diversity on
levels of implicit bias); Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1102–08 (describing studies on the effects of
intergroup contact and of “countertypical exemplars” on levels of implicit bias).
68 See Reskin et al., supra note 45, at 354 (“[T]heorists concur that workplace composition is
consequential for workers and work organization.”); see also Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination Law’s Effects
on Implicit Bias, in 3 NYU SELECTED ESSAYS ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 69, 82–90 (Mitu Gulati & Michael J. Yelnosky eds., 2007) (describing how
existing antidiscrimination law decreases discrimination caused by implicit biases by altering the demographic
makeup of the workplace).
69 See generally Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623 (2005)
(describing the role that work culture plays in discrimination and identifying ways to trigger structural changes
that reshape work cultures).
70 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
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Taken together, this research suggests that considering race and sex
pursuant to an integration narrative in decisions organizing work—in staffing
work teams, assigning clients, creating decision-making committees, even in
arranging physical spaces—can play an important role in reducing
discrimination. The research also indicates, however, that individual decisions
organizing work are unlikely alone to result in any substantial reduction in
discrimination. Indeed, the research teaches that attention to race and sex in
organizing work will be most effective as a discrimination-reducing measure if
it is accompanied by overarching, system-wide integrative efforts.71 Regular
monitoring of systemic and local demographics and power imbalances,
structural changes that open up opportunities for collaborative work
opportunities, and measures that foster egalitarian and peer-support
overarching norms and work cultures are all important to achieving meaningful
integration in work.72
This research calls out for a regulatory middle ground. Instead of
prohibiting all consideration of race and sex in organizing work or deferring
entirely to race- and sex-based decisions made pursuant to the prevailing
narrative, the law might harness existing business interests to advance
structural and cultural changes in organizations that will increase integration in
work and also to foster individual race- and sex-based decisions in organizing
work that serve the broader goal of reducing discrimination. In doing so, the
law might reshape the narrative regarding the relevance of race and sex in
organizing work to emphasize integration and cross-boundary interactions that
break down stereotypes, reduce biases, and destabilize workplace inequality.
C. The Role of Law
The social science research presented in this Part suggests that conscious
consideration of race and sex in organizing work can serve as an important
discrimination-reducing measure but that current considerations of race and
sex are likely to entrench rather than disrupt discriminatory biases and
stereotypes. One response to this research might be to resist regulation of raceand sex-based decisions organizing work. If we are confident that the equality
implications of the research will have widespread normative appeal, then legal
regulation (for example, prohibiting consideration of race or sex in organizing
work) may only serve to inhibit voluntary efforts by employers to reshape the
71
72

See infra Part II.B.2.a (describing systemic efforts).
See id.
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prevailing narrative and to reduce discrimination through race- or sex-based
decisions organizing work. At first glance, this option may seem possible
because decisions organizing work can sometimes slide under the immediate
radar of Title VII. In this section, however, I illustrate that Title VII does
reach decisions organizing work. Moreover, I argue that the best course for
attaining equality is to develop a comprehensive analysis of Title VII as it
applies to decisions organizing work. This latter argument has two parts.
First, without such an analysis, race- and sex-based decisions organizing work
are likely to leave women and minorities worse off than their white and male
counterparts, particularly as the prevailing diversity discourse becomes more
prominent and as white men bring claims of reverse discrimination. Second,
by reaching even a small number of race- and sex-based decisions organizing
work, whether directly or indirectly, in claims brought by traditional plaintiffs
or non-traditional ones, Title VII holds the potential to harness existing
business interests for taking race and sex into account to trigger structural
reforms that will make it more likely that race- and sex-based decisions
organizing work will actually reduce discrimination.
1. Reaching Decisions Organizing Work
The “adverse employment action” requirement of Title VII presents a
potential impediment to the law’s regulation of race- and sex-based decisions
organizing work. Most courts require a plaintiff to have suffered an adverse
employment action before bringing a Title VII claim,73 and many courts have
defined an adverse employment action as one that involves an “ultimate
employment decision,” like hiring, discharge, or promotion.74 Some courts
have construed the requirement more broadly, but even those courts require
that the challenged decision have had an immediate material effect.75 Courts
have held, for example, that a change in job title76 and a transfer from a
position with “increased opportunities for overtime pay, more supervisory
responsibilities, and additional perks, such as the use of a work-provided
73 See Minor v. Centocor, Inc., 457 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[H]undreds if not thousands of
decisions say that an ‘adverse employment action’ is essential to the plaintiff’s prima facie case . . . .”).
74 See, e.g., McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559–60 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding
that only “ultimate employment decisions,” such as hiring and firing decisions, meet the “adverse employment
action” requirement).
75 See Minor, 457 F.3d at 634 (explaining that employment decisions that do not have an immediate
material effect are “not so central to the employment relation that they amount to discriminatory terms or
conditions”).
76 E.g., Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520 F.3d 781, 789–90 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Grayson v. City of
Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 2003)).
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cellular telephone, pager, vehicle, and parking space, as well as having most
weekends and holidays off,”77 were not actionable under Title VII. Similarly,
some courts have held that being denied administrative support, access to
training and leadership courses, and mentoring and training opportunities does
not amount to an adverse employment action.78 Because the harms and
benefits of decisions organizing work are often more difficult to discern,
particularly at the moment of decision, than the harms and benefits of decisions
at entry, exit, or promotion, we can expect that many decisions organizing
work will not satisfy the adverse employment action requirement.
Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that some decisions organizing work
will meet the adverse action requirement. Courts have held, for example, that
assigning more or more burdensome work responsibilities is an adverse
employment action.79 In one case, the court held that a journeyman electrician
suffered an adverse employment action when he was assigned more strenuous
overhead work, was required to work more with a toxic substance, and was
given less varied work than co-workers.80 In another case, a court held that
relocation of a scientist’s laboratory space met the requirement.81 Job transfers
and denials of transfer requests have also been held to satisfy the adverse
action requirement when a reasonable fact finder could find that the
employee’s desired job was “materially more advantageous than the [undesired
job], whether because of prestige, modernity, training opportunity, job
security, or some other objective indicator of desirability.”82 Although these
latter decisions focus on jobs rather than assignments within jobs, the same
reasoning should apply when an individual is asked to take on additional work
or is not assigned desirable work, such as working on a particularly prestigious
team with substantial opportunities for client contact.
More commonly, however, Title VII reaches decisions organizing work
through causation. Most courts—even those adhering to a relatively strict
adverse action requirement—have been willing to reach back to earlier
discriminatory decisions if those decisions caused an adverse employment

77 Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 780–81 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing O’Neal v. City
of Chicago, 392 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2004)).
78 E.g., Earle v. Aramark Corp., 247 F. App’x 519, 523 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
79 E.g., Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008).
80 Id. at 1090.
81 Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2000).
82 Beyer v. County of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2008).
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action.83 Slack v. Havens, an early Title VII case, serves as a textbook
example of how causation analysis permits Title VII to reach decisions
organizing work.84 In that case, four black women alleged that they were
discriminatorily discharged because of their race in violation of Title VII.85
The plaintiffs’ immediate supervisor, Ray Pohasky, had assigned them to
general cleanup of the bonding and coating department and had excused a
white co-worker from the janitorial-type work.86 The plaintiffs objected to
doing the work, which they claimed was not in their job description.87 At
some point during the interchange, Pohasky commented that “Colored people
should stay in their places” and that “Colored folks are hired to clean because
they clean better.”88 The plaintiffs were fired several days later for refusing to
do the work.89 The employer argued that its decision to fire the women was
not racially motivated, even if the assignment by Pohasky to clean the bonding
and coating department was.90 The court rejected the argument, pointing out
that the employer could not be allowed to divorce Pohasky’s discriminatory
conduct from its own “so easily.”91 Rather, because “there was a definite
causal relation between Pohasky’s apparently discriminatory conduct and the
firings,” the firings themselves were discriminatory.92

83 See, e.g., EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 487 (10th Cir. 2006), cert.
granted, 549 U.S. 1105 (2007), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007) (holding that BCI could be held liable
for discrimination of an earlier decision maker if “the biased subordinate’s discriminatory reports,
recommendation, or other actions caused the adverse employment action”); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co.,
28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring that the plaintiff show “that an employee with discriminatory
animus provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action”).
Some courts have required more than causation. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354
F.3d 277, 290–91 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (requiring that the ultimate decision maker be so influenced by the
subordinate that “the subordinate is the actual decisionmaker”). For an argument that the Supreme Court is
likely to resolve the issue by adopting a causation standard, see Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism:
Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 369–75
(2008). Although these recent cases involve different decision makers, the causation analysis should apply to
cases involving the same decision maker as well.
84 Slack v. Havens, No. 72-59-GT, 1973 WL 339 (S.D. Cal. July 17, 1973). The case is included as the
first case in a popular employment discrimination casebook, MICHAEL ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2 (7th ed. 2008).
85 Slack, 1973 WL 339, at *1.
86 Id. at *1–2.
87 Id. at *2.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at *5.
91 Id.
92 Id. at *5–6.
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This issue has received renewed attention as courts have struggled to
develop a doctrine that is responsive to concerns about attenuated causation in
“subordinate bias” cases.93 Although the issue is still unresolved, courts are
unlikely to settle on a standard that places all biased decisions that do not
immediately satisfy the adverse employment action requirement entirely
outside of Title VII’s purview.94 So long as courts continue to look to earlier
decisions for the race- or sex-based determination that resulted in the later
adverse action, decisions organizing work will remain within Title VII’s reach,
even if they fail to satisfy the adverse employment action requirement
themselves.
As a practical matter, of course, many race- and sex-based decisions
organizing work will not realistically be actionable. Unlike Slack v. Havens,
where the plaintiffs presented biased statements of the initial decision maker
and the plaintiffs’ discharge followed closely on the heels of that decision,95 it
will be difficult for most plaintiffs to prove that a discretionary decision
organizing work, particularly one long past, was motivated by race or sex. It
will also be difficult for many plaintiffs to prove that a race- or sex-based
decision caused the later adverse employment action. Although one can
imagine that extra work associated with interviews and pictures for publicity
materials could play a role in a later decision not to promote, it is unlikely that,
absent exceptional circumstances, the employee asked to take on that work
would be able to prove the necessary causal link.96 Indeed, this reality
underlies a longstanding critique of the adverse action requirement: It makes

93

Although the paradigmatic case involves the biased action of a subordinate to the ultimate decision
maker, cases involving similar issues need not involve subordinate decision makers. See Tristin K. Green, On
Macaws and Employer Liability: A Response to Professor Zatz, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 107, 110–11
(2009) (describing other possibilities).
94 To do so, after all, would shield a vast body of adverse actions from employment discrimination law.
An employee who is given a poor evaluation motivated by racial bias, for example, would have no redress,
even in the face of evidence that the evaluation was the sole basis for a later denial of promotion. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case involving subordinate bias in 2007, but the case was dismissed
upon settlement of the parties. EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006),
cert. granted 549 U.S. 1105 (2007), cert. dismissed 549 U.S. 1334 (2007). For a more in-depth description of
the issue presented in these cases, see Green, supra note 83.
95 Slack, 1973 WL 339 at *1–2.
96 It may also take several decisions organizing work, accumulating over time, to cause an adverse
employment action.
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discrimination that occurs in day-to-day social relations difficult to address
through individual disparate treatment law.97
This said, the link between race- and sex-based decisions organizing work
and an adverse employment action will sometimes be relatively clear. Imagine
a challenge to a manager’s decision to appoint a black woman to a prestigious
work team when few black women work at the firm and a black woman has
been appointed to the team for five consecutive years. A white man who is not
appointed to the team alleges that his later denial of promotion for “lack of
prestigious appointments and connections with high-profile clients” resulted in
part from the manager’s race-based decision not to place him on that team.
Plaintiffs have also had some success in challenging decisions organizing
work in the systemic context. In Kosen v. American Express Financial
Advisors, Inc., for example, the plaintiffs argued that sex-based discriminatory
bias in client assignments caused a disparity in pay and promotion between
men and women.98 A number of recent, high-profile class action lawsuits have
similarly focused on discriminatory work assignments and their effect on
mentoring and promotion opportunities as a factor in widespread disparities in
promotions and pay.99
The adverse action requirement, together with the difficulty of proving that
any single decision was race or sex based, particularly a highly discretionary
decision like one organizing work, means that Title VII will reach some, but
not all, race- and sex-based decisions organizing work. Decisions to tap a
minority worker for publicity materials, to compose a racially diverse work
team, or even to assign a woman to a hiring committee, are unlikely to see
extended Title VII review. Indeed, most race- and sex-based decisions will fly
under the radar of Title VII in the sense that the individuals whose race or sex

97 See Green, supra note 57, at 116–17 (arguing that employees working in decentralized, more fluid
work settings “will find it more difficult to satisfy [the adverse action requirement], and discrimination against
this individual will go unaddressed”).
98 See Complaint at 9–20, Kosen v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 1:02-CV-00082-HHK (D.D.C.
Jan. 17, 2002) (alleging that American Express maintained an informal system of choosing “superstars” from
incoming recruits for training allotment, mentoring selection, and assignment of important leads and accounts
that led to disparities in pay and promotion). The parties in Kosen settled prior to trial. Consent Decree at 2,
Kosen v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 1:02-CV-00082-HHK (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2002).
99 See generally Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 332–34 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (involving
assignment of women to various low-level jobs and the effect of those assignments on later promotions);
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
458, 509–19 (2001) (describing the process and implementation of settlement in a case against Home Depot).
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was taken into account will be unable to establish that his or her race or sex
was a causal factor in an adverse employment action.
This does not mean, however, that Title VII has no role to play in
regulating consideration of race and sex in decisions organizing work—or that
Title VII adequately polices the decisions that it currently reaches. In the next
section, I make the case for developing a comprehensive analysis of the
permissibility of race- and sex-based decisions organizing work as a way of
generating evenhanded scrutiny and harnessing the potential of existing
business interests to advance workplace equality and reduce discrimination.
Title VII need not reach all decisions organizing work to play this role.
2. The Importance of Developing Title VII Law as It Applies to Decisions
Organizing Work
There are several reasons why it is important to develop a comprehensive
analysis of Title VII as it applies to race- and sex-based decisions organizing
work, even if few individuals harmed by decisions organizing work will
ultimately be successful in a Title VII claim. The first is reactive. Without a
comprehensive, reasoned analysis of Title VII as it applies to all considerations
of race and sex in decisions organizing work, women and minorities who
suffer work-related harms as a result of these decisions are likely to end up
worse off than their white, male counterparts.
The growing prominence of the business case for diversity makes it
increasingly likely that reverse discrimination claims involving decisions
organizing work will arise.100 As whites and men become aware of the valueadded diversity rhetoric—and perceive it as a substitute for other justifications
for race- and sex-based decision making—they may challenge more
employment decisions as being based on race or sex.101 In many cases,
moreover, it will be easier for reverse discrimination plaintiffs to prove that a
100 See, e.g., Roger Clegg, President, Ctr. for Equal Opportunity, Statement to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (Feb. 28, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/meetings/228-07/transcript.html) [hereinafter Statement of Roger Clegg] (arguing that the business case for diversity
results in race-based decisions that harm whites). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ricci reinforces this
point. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673–74 (2009) (holding that race-conscious decisions must
be justified under Title VII, even when they do not result in a racial preference). For discussion of this point in
the constitutional context, see Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1395.
101 See Statement of Roger Clegg, supra note 100; see also Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 1, at 971–73
(identifying a rise in “diversity management” and a decline in “affirmative action”). As diversity rhetoric
becomes accepted within the business community, managers may also be more likely to express diversitybased reasons for their decisions.
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particular decision was motivated by race or sex. Taking the earlier example
of a law firm with few African-American associates, we can expect that regular
appointment of an African-American associate to a prestigious committee,
such as a recruitment committee, will look more suspicious (because it is less
likely due to chance) than regular appointment of a white associate to the same
committee.
Perceptions about the harms and benefits of decisions organizing work are
also likely to differ. Because the business case for diversity has been framed
as a benefit to women and minorities, workers as well as adjudicators are likely
to more readily see harms to whites and men. Moreover, race- and sex-based
decisions pursuant to the “service” prong of the diversity narrative are likely to
be consistent with stereotypes regarding group differences and, particularly at
the level of organizing work, may therefore be viewed as natural rather than as
something about which antidiscrimination law should be concerned.
These realities, including the role that stereotyping is likely to play in
claims and adjudication, expose the importance of understanding how Title VII
guides managers’ voluntary, conscious use of race and sex in organizing work.
Under the law as it is currently implemented, race- and sex-based decisions
organizing work that are undertaken as business-enhancing measures—which
are often stereotype confirming—will only rarely seem problematic, while
similar decisions that harm men and whites will be heavily scrutinized.
Along these same lines, developing Title VII law as it applies to decisions
organizing work should highlight the reality that women and minorities can
(and often do) bear costs pursuant to race- and sex-based decisions organizing
work. Currently, that reality tends to get buried beneath assumptions that raceand sex-based decisions made pursuant to the prevailing diversity discourse are
always “affirmative action,” exhibiting preferences for members of
traditionally subordinated groups. This assumption can be problematic even at
the level of entry, promotion, and exit, but it is particularly misplaced at the
level of organizing work, where extra work is frequently expected of women
and minorities even as they sometimes obtain benefits in the form of status or
relational opportunities. A woman who is assigned to a high-profile,
prestigious team based on a client’s demands for diverse representation may
bear a cost as well as a benefit from that assignment.
The other reason to develop a comprehensive analysis of Title VII as it
applies to decisions organizing work is more opportunistic and proactive. As I
have shown, the prevailing diversity discourse makes race and sex relevant in
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organizing work as a business matter. Firms perceive a bottom-line interest in
making race- and sex-based decisions organizing work. In the next Part, I
argue that although Title VII permits race- and sex-based decisions organizing
work that are intended to further the statute’s goal of reducing workplace
discrimination, it does not permit race- and sex-based decisions organizing
work that are intended solely to advance business interests. As a practical
matter, however, there is likely to be some overlap between these decisions. In
other words, some of the same decisions might serve business interests as well
as Title VII’s statutory goals. Placing an African-American man on a
recruitment committee might simultaneously signal the firm’s adherence to
egalitarian norms and reduce discrimination. Similarly, assigning a Latino
worker to a team charged with promoting a product for a Latino market might
serve the firm’s business interest of reaching that market and, depending on the
demographic makeup of the work team, reduce discrimination. This overlap
creates an opportunity for Title VII to harness the business interests already
embraced by employers to advance antidiscrimination goals. Indeed, because
Title VII requires that even those race- and sex-based decisions that are
intended to reduce discrimination be part of an employer’s broader effort to
foster functional integration, employers may undertake those efforts as a way
of obtaining deference to their race- and sex-based decisions organizing work.
Those integrative efforts, in turn, are likely to serve bottom-line interests not
only by reducing discrimination but also by generating cross-cultural
competence and a context for interaction that enhances productivity, creativity,
and job satisfaction.102
In this way, the interpretation of Title VII presented here offers an
untapped regulatory middle ground, an opportunity to reframe the narrative
guiding the consideration of race and sex in decisions organizing work to
foster workplace integration and reduce discrimination. Even if reverse
discrimination claims are likely to serve as the catalyst for legal analysis,
women and people of color serve to benefit as much as white men from the
development of an antidiscrimination law that encourages employers to take
race and sex into account in organizing work in ways that will reduce
discrimination rather than perpetuate it.

102 Indeed, these are some of the business interests cited in the corporate amicus briefs in Grutter. See
Amicus Curiae Brief of General Motors Corp., supra note 28, at 15–17.
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II. DEVELOPING TITLE VII LAW AS IT APPLIES TO DECISIONS ORGANIZING
WORK
In this Part, I develop Title VII law governing the voluntary, conscious use
of race and sex in organizing work. I argue that race- and sex-conscious
decisions organizing work are and should be permissible under Title VII if
they are intended to reduce workplace discrimination and are part of a broader
integrative effort by the employer to further that Title VII goal. The law under
this proposal acts most directly at the level of organizational policy making; it
harnesses business interests for taking race and sex into account to serve the
goals of Title VII. But the effect of the law is likely to be felt more indirectly,
in the reframing of the narrative that guides managerial consideration of race
and sex in organizing work.
Although the interpretation of Title VII that I present here is consistent with
Supreme Court case law, it advances the law addressing conscious use of race
and sex in employment decisions in two significant ways. First, it expands the
permissible justifications for race- and sex-based decisions to include the goal
of reducing present and future discrimination, while tethering permissible
justifications to the employment context. In doing so, it resolves the question
left open by the Supreme Court’s dismissal of certiorari in Taxman v. Board of
Education of Piscataway103 in favor of deference, but it also diverges
substantially from proposals made by legal scholars seeking to incorporate
principles from Grutter v. Bollinger into the employment realm. Second, it
requires that race- and sex-based decisions that are intended to reduce
discrimination be tied to systemic efforts by organizations to foster integration
in work. This second advancement builds directly on Supreme Court case law
in the area and extends the requirement of a micro–macro link into the realm of
decisions organizing work that are aimed at reducing discrimination.
A. Furthering the Goals of Title VII
To be permissible under Title VII, any use of race or sex in employment
decisions must further the goals of the statute. The Supreme Court has decided
two principal cases in which it considered whether and under what
circumstances Title VII permits an employer to make race- or sex-based

103 91 F.3d 1547 (3d. Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert. dismissed 522 U.S.
1010 (1997) (addressing whether furtherance of a non-remedial Title VII goal can justify a race- or sex-based
decision).
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employment decisions.104 In each of those cases, the Court upheld the
employer’s use of race and sex as permissible under Title VII.
In its 1979 decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, the Court
upheld a collective bargaining plan negotiated between Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp. and the United Steelworkers of America that reserved fifty
percent of the openings in a Kaiser-sponsored craft training program for
African Americans.105 African Americans had long been excluded from craft
unions, which meant that they did not have the necessary credentials for craft
work at Kaiser.106 At the time that Kaiser implemented the plan, less than two
percent of Kaiser’s craft work force was African American, compared with
thirty-nine percent of the local labor force.107 To increase the number of
African Americans in craft positions, Kaiser and the union agreed that fifty
percent of the openings for the Kaiser craft training program would be reserved
for African Americans until the percentage of African-American craft workers
at the Kaiser plant approximated the percentage of African Americans in the
local labor force.108
The Supreme Court in Weber held that Title VII does not forbid all
consideration of race or sex in employment decisions.109 It also upheld
Kaiser’s use of race in selecting applicants for the training program.110 In two
short paragraphs, the Court explained why the Kaiser plan permitting
consideration of race fell “on the permissible side of the line”:
The purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute. Both were
designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy. Both were structured to “open employment opportunities
for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to
them.”
At the same time, the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the
interests of the white employees. The plan does not require the
discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black
104 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), falls outside of
this category; it involved an employer’s decision not to certify test results based on the disparate impact that
certification would have on minority firefighters, rather than a sex- or race-based employment decision
regarding any individual employee. Id. at 2664.
105 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979).
106 Id. at 198–99.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 199.
109 Id. at 197.
110 Id. at 208.

GREEN GALLEYSFINAL

616

6/10/2010 1:49 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

hirees. Nor does the plan create an absolute bar to the advancement
of white employees; half of those trained in the program will be
white. Moreover, the plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended
to maintain a racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial
111
imbalance.

Less than ten years later, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County, the Court upheld a city transportation agency plan that authorized
consideration of the sex of qualified applicants in making promotions to
positions within a traditionally segregated job classification in which women
had been significantly underrepresented.112
The plaintiff in Johnson
challenged the agency’s decision made pursuant to the plan to promote a
woman instead of a man to the position of road dispatcher.113 Applying
Weber, the Court held that to justify the use of race or sex as a factor in an
employment decision there need only be a “manifest imbalance” in a
traditionally segregated job category, not such an imbalance as would support
a prima facie case of discrimination against the employer.114 Because there
was a manifest imbalance in that case (of the 238 skilled craft jobs, not one
was filled by a woman), and because the plan did not “unnecessarily trammel”
the interests of the majority, the Court upheld the agency’s consideration of sex
in the promotion decision.115
The affirmative action plans at issue in both Weber and Johnson were
remedial in the sense that they were intended to remedy the effects of past
discrimination, whether carried out by the employer or by an entity closely
affiliated with the employer.116 Although the Court did not require the
employer in either Weber or Johnson to show that it had discriminated before it
could take race or sex into account in employment decisions,117 the Court did
emphasize in both cases that the plans were designed to “break down old
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy”118 and that the use of race or sex
would end as soon as the percentage of African Americans or women in the
job category mirrored the percentage of members of that group in the relevant

111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. (citation and footnote omitted) (quoting remarks of Sen. Humphrey, 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964)).
480 U.S. 616, 620–21 (1987).
Id. at 624–25.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 634–36.
Id. at 620–25; Weber, 443 U.S. at 197–99.
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632; Weber, 443 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (majority opinion).
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labor pool.119 This focus on addressing the effects of past discrimination,
whether by the employer or by society in general, rendered the plans in Weber
and Johnson at least loosely remedial.
Although the use of race and sex in both Weber and Johnson was remedial,
the Court did not foreclose race- or sex-conscious decision making to further
non-remedial Title VII goals. The most immediate non-remedial goal of Title
VII is reducing present and future workplace discrimination. In this section, I
argue that race- and sex-based decisions organizing work can be justified under
Title VII as means of reducing discrimination in the employer’s workplace but
that they cannot be justified as means either of furthering the business reasons
that underlie the prevailing narrative or of advancing social equality directly.
In the remainder of this Part, I delineate the contours of a permissible plan for
taking race or sex into account in organizing work.
1. Reducing Workplace Discrimination
Reducing discrimination in the workplace is a primary goal of Title VII.
As the Supreme Court stated in one of its early Title VII decisions, “The
language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and
devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the
disadvantage of minority citizens.”120 More recently, the Court has relied on
the goal of reducing workplace discrimination in shaping the law of vicarious
liability and the law of punitive damages under Title VII. In Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, for example, the Court held that when applied to
claims of harassment, the agency principles governing vicarious liability in the
Restatement Second of Agency should be modified to serve Title VII’s “basic
policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by
objecting employees.”121 And in Kolstad v. American Dental, which held that

119 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640; Weber, 443 U.S. at 208–09. In Weber, the comparison was to the local
labor force because of the longstanding exclusion of blacks from craft unions. Id. at 208–09 (“Preferential
selection of craft trainees at the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage of black skilled
craftworkers in the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.”).
120 McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); see also Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (stating that “the primary objective [of Title VII] was a prophylactic one”).
121 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998); see also Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998) (explaining
that it created the defense because the primary objective of Title VII is “not to provide redress but to avoid
harm” and explaining that “[i]t would . . . implement clear statutory policy and complement the Government’s
Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize the employer’s affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give
credit here to employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty”).
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employers should not be liable for punitive damages based on discriminatory
decisions by employees when those decisions are “contrary to the employer’s
good faith efforts to comply with Title VII,” the Court explained that the
statute’s “primary objective is a prophylactic one; it aims, chiefly, not to
provide redress but to avoid harm.”122
The case law is less clear about whether furthering the goal of reducing
workplace discrimination justifies race- and sex-consciousness in decision
making. In Taxman v. Board of Education of Piscataway, the majority of a
Third Circuit en banc court held that the only justification for race- or sexconscious decision making that can satisfy Title VII is a remedial one.123
Under this view, any use of race or sex must be aimed at “remedying the
results of any prior discrimination [by the defendant organization] or identified
underrepresentation of minorities [within the organization].”124
Taxman involved a mandatory lay off of teachers in the Township of
Piscataway, New Jersey school district.125 The town had adopted a policy
aimed at providing “equal educational opportunity for students and equal
employment opportunity for employees and prospective employees.”126 The
policy provided that minority status would serve as a tie-breaker between
candidates of equal qualification.127 In 1989, the school board was faced with
the task of laying off a teacher in the business department at Piscataway High
School.128 Debra Williams, a black woman, and Sharon Taxman, a white
woman, both taught in the department and had exactly the same seniority.129
The board determined that they were “‘two teachers of equal ability’ and
‘equal qualifications.’”130 Invoking the town policy to break the tie, the board

Although the Court in Burlington Industries relied on the prophylactic goal of Title VII, that goal
neither required nor necessarily justified cutting back on vicarious liability. See Green, supra note 83, at 359–
60 (describing Burlington Industries as resting on a belief that individual and employer interests with respect
to discrimination have diverged).
122 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999) (quoting Albermarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 417, and Faragher, 524 U.S. at
806 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
123 91 F.3d 1547, 1557 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert. dismissed 522
U.S. 1010 (1997)
124 Id. at 1550.
125 Id. at 1551.
126 Id. at 1550.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1551.
129 Id.
130 Id.
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voted to lay off Taxman.131 Theodore H. Kruse, the board’s president,
explained his vote to apply the policy in terms of the educational benefits that
derive from diversity in a teaching staff.132
The Third Circuit in Taxman decided that because neither the school
district’s affirmative action plan nor the board president’s diversity rationale
furthered the remedial purpose of Title VII, the board’s consideration of race in
the decision to lay off Taxman violated Title VII.133 According to the court, if
Title VII had been designed only to eradicate discrimination—and not to
remedy the consequences of prior discrimination—no race- or sex-conscious
decisions would be permitted.134 Because taking an individual’s race or sex
into account in an employment decision is itself discriminatory, and therefore
violates Title VII’s nondiscrimination mandate, it can only be justified by the
furtherance of another Title VII goal.135 As Judge Mansmann, writing for the
majority, stated:
The significance of this second corrective purpose cannot be
overstated. It is only because Title VII was written to eradicate not
only discrimination per se but the consequences of prior
discrimination as well, that racial preferences in the form of
affirmative action can co-exist with the Act’s antidiscrimination
136
mandate.

What the Third Circuit in Taxman misses is that taking race or sex into
account in a particular decision, while violating Title VII’s nondiscrimination
mandate with respect to a single individual, can further a much broader and
more pervasive reduction in workplace discrimination. Indeed, as the research
in Part I shows, taking race and sex into account in organizing work can be a

131
132

Id.
Id. at 1551–52. In deposition testimony, Kruse provided the following explanation for his vote:
Basically I think because I had been aware that the student body and the community which is our
responsibility, the schools of the community, is really quite diverse and there—I have a general
feeling during my tenure on the board that it was valuable for the students to see in the various
employment roles a wide range of background, and that it was also valuable to the work force
and in particular to the teaching staff that they have—they see that in each other.

Id. It is possible that Kruse intended to articulate a discrimination-reducing rationale with the latter part of his
explanation, but he did not elaborate. See id. at 1552 (elaborating upon further questions on the “educational
objective”).
133 Id. at 1557–58.
134 Id. at 1557.
135 Id.
136 Id.
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particularly effective tool for reducing biases and stereotypes in day-to-day
decision making and interaction at work.137 If by taking race or sex into
account in an employment decision the employer aims to advance this broader
goal—to reduce the incidence of decisions based on racial or gender bias
within the workplace as a whole—then the employer’s purpose mirrors the
purposes of Title VII.
Applied to decisions organizing work, this interpretation of Title VII means
that minorities as well as whites and women as well as men may bear a cost for
the advancement of the statute’s broader nondiscrimination goals. When the
only black lawyer in a law firm is assigned to staff a work-intensive case, to
attend recruitment dinners for multiple minority job candidates, and to serve
regularly on the firm’s diversity committee, she may bear various costs.
Similarly, when a minority firefighter or sales representative or line worker at
an automobile manufacturing plant is asked to perform particular “signaling”
or other work because of her race or sex, she may bear various costs. Even if
the employer in each of these instances is required to compensate the employee
for extra work (and I argue that it should be), in many cases the woman or
minority is likely nonetheless to suffer residual costs, particularly because of
the difficulty in discerning the precise nature and extent of the costs imposed,
including those associated with identity.
Focusing on the antisubordination underpinning of Title VII helps make
clear why the imposition of this cost on individual women and people of color
can be justified as a means of reducing discrimination more broadly within the
employer’s workplace, just as similar costs can be justified when they are
imposed on men or whites as a means of reducing discrimination or, more
traditionally, as a means of correcting a “manifest imbalance” in a particular
job category. In both cases, individuals are expected to bear costs for the sake
of a statutorily identified broader goal. The statute seeks to alleviate the
economic and social subordination of traditionally subordinated groups by
reducing discrimination in employment,138 and research suggests that race- and
sex-based decisions organizing work can further that goal.139 Just as in the
traditional affirmative action context, moreover, if there were reason to believe
that permitting individual race- and sex-based decisions that impose costs on

137
138

See supra Part I.B.
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202–04 (1979) (describing the goals of Title

VII).
139

See supra Part I.B.
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women and people of color would translate into increased discrimination or
subordination within the workplace or in society more generally, then the law’s
approach to those decisions should be reconsidered.140
2. Other Business Reasons
It should be relatively clear by now that the business interests pursued
under the prevailing narrative—including serving markets and signaling
fairness and diversity—do not justify race- and sex-based decisions under Title
VII. The interests themselves may be legitimate, but Title VII requires that
employers find ways of furthering those interests without taking race or sex
into account in employment decisions or by taking race and sex into account in
ways that simultaneously further Title VII’s broader statutory goals.
This point is in some tension with several recent circuit court cases
analyzing race-conscious decisions under the Equal Protection Clause. In
these cases, courts have held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit
consideration of race when it is used to further the mission of a prison or the
efficacy of a police force.141 Wittmer v. Peters involved a state-run prison boot
camp designed “to give the inmates an experience similar to that of oldfashioned military basic training.”142 The camp security staff consisted of
forty-eight correctional officers, three captains, and ten lieutenants; sixty-eight
percent of the camp’s two hundred inmates were black.143 The Illinois
Department of Corrections considered race as a factor in its decision to appoint
a black man to the lieutenant position.144 It argued that consideration of race
was needed and constitutionally permissible “because the black inmates are
believed unlikely to play the correctional game of brutal drill sergeant and
brutalized recruit unless there are some blacks in authority in the camp.”145

140 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative
Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (1998) (considering whether the group harms associated with affirmative
action in education outweigh the group benefits).
141 Because the recent cases illustrating this distinction between affirmative action analysis under Title
VII and under the Equal Protection Clause have involved race, I focus here on race. There are several
differences between the race and sex contexts. First, the Supreme Court has applied a less exacting level of
scrutiny to decisions based on sex than to decisions based on race. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 534 (1996) (requiring an “exceedingly persuasive justification” in the context of sex discrimination).
Second, Title VII’s BFOQ provision includes sex, but not race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006).
142 87 F.3d 916, 917 (7th Cir. 1996).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 920.
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Decisions based on race must survive strict scrutiny review to be lawful
under the Equal Protection Clause.146 Under strict scrutiny review, the
government’s use of race must further a “compelling governmental interest[]”
and be “narrowly tailored” to that interest.147 Even without addressing what
constitutes narrow tailoring, the compelling interests permitted under the Equal
Protection Clause may be broader than those permitted under Title VII. In
Wittmer, for example, the Seventh Circuit held that the success of the prison
boot camp constituted a compelling government interest, and the preference
afforded the black man in appointing him to the position of lieutenant was
narrowly tailored to that interest.148 Similarly, in Petit v. City of Chicago, the
Seventh Circuit held that the Chicago Police Department “had a compelling
interest in a diverse population at the rank of sergeant in order to set the proper
tone in the department and to earn the trust of the community, which in turn
increases police effectiveness in protecting the city.”149 In both of these cases,
the court pointed to the efficacy of the employer’s program as the ground for
permitting race- or sex-conscious decision making.150
These cases may represent a movement in constitutional law toward
deference to race- and sex-based decision making in employment, at least in
some circumstances. Regardless of whether the courts in these cases are
correct about the permissible scope of race- and sex-based decision making
under the Equal Protection Clause, however, the cases say little about Title
VII.151 Title VII does not ask whether the use of race or sex serves a
compelling government interest. Instead, it requires that race- and sexconscious decisions further the goals of the statute. The employer’s interest in
best serving the client or in enhancing safety comes into a Title VII analysis
under the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense, and, as others
have argued before me, regulators (and courts) should be wary of expanding
what is now a very narrow exception to the general prohibition on the use of
race and sex in employment decisions.152
146

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
Id.
148 Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920.
149 Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003).
150 Id.; Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920.
151 The court in Petit relied in part on Grutter as a basis for its analysis. Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114. For an
argument that Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007),
rendered the Seventh Circuit’s view of Grutter less tenable, see Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of
Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV.
937 (2008).
152 See Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 10.
147
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3. Social Equality
Understanding the narrow limits that Title VII places on the use of race and
sex in employment decisions also helps unravel why Taxman was correctly
decided, even if the Third Circuit’s rationale and its broad pronouncement that
Title VII permits only remedial justifications for race-based decisions are
wrong. The rationale put forward by the school district in Taxman for taking
race into account can be construed in several ways. It can be construed as a
matter of serving the district’s clients—the students—raising all of the
concerns about the use of race and sex to serve clients already discussed. It
can also be construed more explicitly as a way of advancing social equality.
Research shows that black students are more likely to succeed if they are
exposed to black teachers.153 Seeing blacks in positions of power can lower
implicit biases and stereotyping in both non-black and black students and can
alter behavior accordingly.154 Having more successful black students graduate
from high school advances not only the interests of those students but also the
broader goal of social equality. Similarly, by sending into society students of
all colors who are less biased and better able to interact comfortably with
members of different racial groups, the school district reduces group
subordination, stigmatization, and intergroup hostility—the hallmarks of
inequality—in society at large.
Along these lines, a number of legal scholars have argued that Title VII
might be interpreted to permit employers to take race or sex into account in
employment decisions if those decisions further broader societal interests.
Professors Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji make this claim in their article,
Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action.”155
They argue that an employer should be permitted under Title VII to hire an
Asian professor “partly to decrease bias against Asians among business school
students.”156 According to Kang and Banaji, the employer’s objective to “stop
discrimination by decreasing the implicit bias in students, who will graduate to
become future workers, employers, and leaders” is “consonant with the goals
of Title VII, even as narrowly interpreted in Taxman.”157 Professor Cynthia
Estlund makes a similar, though slightly more nuanced, claim in her article,
153

See generally Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1106–09 (discussing research underlying support of
“debiasing” agents).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 1111.
157 Id. at 1114–15; see also id. at 1111–12 (relying on Grutter).
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Putting Grutter to Work.158 She argues that “Grutter’s recognition of the civil
and societal value of integrated institutions” provides reason to read Title VII
to permit an employer to address a “manifest imbalance in a predominately
white workplace or job” regardless of the employer’s reason for doing so.159
Estlund expects that in this way the Grutter reasoning can open Title VII to
permit integrationist efforts by employers, even if those efforts are not aimed at
remedying past discrimination like the efforts approved by the Court in Weber
and Johnson.160
It is tempting to join these scholars in seeking to interpret Title VII to
permit race- and sex-conscious decision making aimed at furthering social
equality directly, for such an interpretation would allow employers substantial
leeway to take race or sex into account. Social equality is unquestionably an
end goal of antidiscrimination laws, including Title VII, and the utilization of
affirmative action in a variety of work contexts could go a long way toward
easing the subordination and stigmatization suffered by women and people of
color for generations in this country.
But this deference approach is problematic, not only because it would leave
employers free to make race- or sex-based decisions pursuant to the prevailing
narrative. There are at least two additional reasons why Title VII should limit
consideration of race or sex in organizing work to those decisions that are
aimed at furthering the goal of social equality through reduced workplace
discrimination rather than through some other means, such as client exposure
to a diverse workforce or student exposure to a diverse faculty. Both of these
reasons are based firmly in the text and goals of Title VII. The first is broadly
normative and may be applicable to all employment decisions; the second is
more practical and may be specific to decisions organizing work.
Title VII is the employment provision of the Civil Rights Act,161 and as
such it emphasizes the goal of reducing employment discrimination as a means
of reducing economic and social subordination.162 Title VII does sometimes
impose a cost on employers for society’s wrongs. The most basic example can
158

Estlund, supra note 10.
Id. at 35–36.
160 Id.
Professor Estlund also makes this argument in her book, Working Together, where she
acknowledges the difficulty that Title VII’s antidiscrimination mandate poses. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING
TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 147–49 (2003).
161 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
162 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (explaining that Title VII was “designed
to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy”).
159
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be found in disparate impact theory, which requires employers to alter
employment practices that have a disparate impact on members of a protected
group, even if that impact is caused by inferior access to education or other
resources.163 Taking race or sex into account in organizing work, however,
places a cost directly on individuals, and that cost, as the court in Taxman
pointed out, violates the narrow nondiscrimination mandate of Title VII by
virtue of its being race or sex based. In this way, an employer’s use of race or
sex in organizing work violates individuals’ rights under the Act. But while
Congress in Title VII specifically encourages employers to take steps to reduce
discrimination in their workplaces (therefore justifying the imposition of raceand sex-based costs on individuals in some circumstances), it does not
encourage efforts that solely advance societal interests, whether in the form of
reduced subordination or a healthier democracy.164 Instead, societal interests,
at least when race- and sex-based employment decisions are involved, must be
advanced through reduced discrimination in employment.
Nor has the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII opened the door to
the use of race or sex in workplace decision making as a means of advancing
social equality directly. In Weber and in Johnson, the Court held that Title VII
permits employers to take race and sex into account in employment decisions
as a means of remedying a manifest racial or gender imbalance between the
employer’s workforce and the relevant labor pool.165 At first glance, this
seems to support the use of race and sex in employment decisions as a means
of directly furthering social equality. After all, in Weber, the employer was
responding to the union’s longstanding exclusion of blacks from the craft
union, not to its own discrimination against blacks.166 And in Johnson, the
Court stressed that the employer need not have caused the underrepresentation
of women that it sought to remedy.167 However, the remedial nature of the use

163 See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 647 (2001); see
also Green, supra note 13, at 877–79 (distinguishing cases in which disparate impact theory operates as an
antidiscrimination mandate from those in which disparate impact theory operates as an accommodation
mandate, requiring employers to bear a cost for society’s wrongs).
164 I agree here with Professor Yelnosky, who argues that a “prevention justification” fares better than a
societal justification “in light of the existing statutory framework in which America’s employers operate.”
Yelnosky, supra note 12, at 1416.
165 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631–32 (1987).
166 Weber, 443 U.S. at 198.
167 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 634 n.12 (quoting the court of appeals for the proposition that “[a] plethora of
proof is hardly necessary to show that women are generally underrepresented in such positions and that strong
social pressures weigh against their participation”). Justice O’Connor, whose concurrence supplied the sixth
vote to uphold the program, objected to the Johnson majority’s failure to require a tighter remedial connection.
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of race and sex in Weber and Johnson brought the plans within the bounds of
the employment statute.168 The requirement of a manifest imbalance in a
traditionally segregated job category ensures that a race or sex preference will
break down racial segregation and hierarchy in employment.169 If the
defendant in either case had a proportional representation of blacks or women
in the targeted job category, even if society as a whole had engaged in or
continued to engage in subordination of those groups in those job categories,
the plans would not have satisfied Title VII.
Requiring that race- and sex-conscious decisions further the Title VII goal
of reducing workplace discrimination also serves to limit employer discretion
in a way that makes it more likely that race- or sex-conscious decisions
organizing work will actually serve the broader social equality goal of the
statute. One of the primary objections to social equality as a permissible
justification for race- or sex-based decision making is its open-endedness and
lack of measurable goals.170 Although measuring whether consideration of
race and sex in organizing work is serving to reduce employment
discrimination in an organization is admittedly difficult (more difficult, for
instance, than measuring whether specific numerical goals have been met), it is
much easier to monitor the efficacy of discrimination-reducing measures in a
workplace than in society as a whole. With a more limited goal—reduced
workplace discrimination—comes greater possibility for meaningful oversight.
Indeed, the need for a focus on reducing discrimination in employment
decisions (rather than on attaining the benefits of integration for society as a
whole) is particularly urgent in the context of organizing work. When it comes
to organizing work, the benefits and/or harms of any particular decision are
difficult to discern. As discussed in Part I, a black man who is assigned to a
particular work team as a way of adding diversity to an otherwise all-white or
Id. at 654 (O’Connor, J., concurring). She concurred only because she found a “statistical disparity sufficient
to support a prima facie claim under Title VII.” Id. at 649.
168 Weber, 443 U.S. at 201; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620.
169 With its adherence to a manifest imbalance requirement, Professor Estlund’s proposal does come back
around to employment, despite her broader arguments about permitting race- and sex-based decisions to
address social inequality directly. For more discussion of this requirement, see infra Part II.B.2.b. In the
context of entry and promotion decisions, in contrast to decisions organizing work, it should be relatively clear
whether a member of a traditionally subordinated group is being provided a benefit.
170 See, e.g., Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1564 (3d. Cir. 1996) (expressing concern that use of
race and sex in layoff decisions was “devoid of goals” and led to standardless determinations “governed
entirely by the Board’s whim”); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986)
(expressing concern that permitting race-based decision making to remedy societal discrimination or to
provide role models for students is too “amorphous”).
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racially skewed team may suffer harm in the form of extra work that his white
counterparts are not similarly asked to undertake or in the form of a less
desirable work assignment.171 Although this cost may be justified by a broader
reduction in discrimination, limiting permissible interests to the Title VII
interest of reducing discrimination in the employer organization makes it more
likely that the individuals who bear the immediate and direct cost of race- and
sex-based decisions organizing work will also recognize the broader benefits
of those decisions.
The requirement that any use of race and sex be aimed at furthering the
goal of reducing employment discrimination will constrain the use of race and
sex in some instances. It will be difficult for employers to successfully argue,
for example, that assigning a Latino man to a predominately Latino-staffed
sales division serving a Latino market furthers the Title VII goal of reducing
workplace discrimination. In many cases, though, race- or sex-based decisions
may simultaneously be good for business and further the goal of reducing
discrimination. Retaining a black teacher in the business department, for
example, may simultaneously reduce discrimination in employment decisions
regarding other teachers and staff within the district and further social equality
by exposing students to a diverse range of teachers in the business department.
Similarly, asking an Asian employee to be interviewed and photographed for
an internally and externally circulated publicity document may reduce
discrimination in employment decisions by fostering a culture that values
integration at the same time that it improves the firm’s image on diversity
matters with clients and applicants.172 In this way, employers may be able to
achieve many of their business goals while also furthering the goals of Title
VII.
This reality opens the door to the harnessing potential of Title VII in this
context. Race- and sex-based decisions that are permissible under Title VII
need not be perceived as counterproductive to business. To the contrary, the
narrative as reshaped by Title VII should make clear that taking race and sex
into account in decisions organizing work can serve business interests and

171

See supra Part I.A. At the same time, he may benefit from opportunities to interact with powerful
people and from the prestige of the assignment. Even these benefits, however, will be highly contextdependent and may be nonexistent or outweighed by the costs in a particular case.
172 Similarly, the school district in Taxman could argue that having a black teacher in the otherwise allwhite business division furthers the goal of reducing discrimination against teachers. The board president in
Taxman may have tried to do this in explaining his vote. See supra note 132.
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simultaneously foster integration that reduces discrimination and inequality in
work.173
B. Drawing a Micro–Macro Link: An Integrative Effort
Accepting that a decision taking race or sex into account in organizing
work can be justified by furtherance of the goals of Title VII, the law still
needs some way of ensuring that each race- or sex-conscious decision is likely
to further those goals. When the use of race or sex is meant to serve Title
VII’s remedial goals, like in Weber and Johnson, the link between the decision
imposing a race- or sex-based cost on an individual and Title VII’s broader
remedial goal is established by the employer’s showing of a “manifest
imbalance” in a traditionally segregated job category.174 The employer makes
this showing by comparing the racial or gender makeup of the employer’s
workforce or job category with the racial or gender makeup of the relevant
labor pool.175 If this comparison reflects a manifest imbalance in the racial or
gender demographics of a particular job category, then the employer is
justified in taking race or sex into account in hiring, firing, or promotion
decisions involving that category until a better demographic balance is
attained.176 The manifest imbalance requirement of Weber and Johnson
therefore ensures that the use of race or sex in any individual decision furthers
the Title VII goal of “break[ing] down old patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy” by altering the racial or gender demographics of the job category in
question.177
In much the same way, the micro decisions taking race or sex into account
in organizing work should link to the macro goal of reducing discrimination in
the workplace. I begin this section by exploring in more depth the idea of a
micro–macro link under Title VII and the implications of such a requirement.
I then propose that the micro–macro link be established by a showing that any

173 Indeed, considering race and sex in order to reduce discrimination as part of a broader integrative
effort is also likely to serve the “cross-cultural competence” argument made by major corporations in Grutter.
See supra note 28.
174 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 637 (1987); United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 208–09 (1979).
175 Weber represents a divergence from the usual comparison because the pool from which the defendant
drew its qualified workers had been skewed by years of discrimination against blacks. 443 U.S. at 208–09
(describing the relevant comparison as between the job category and the local labor force).
176 See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637; Weber, 443 U.S. at 208–09.
177 Weber, 443 U.S. at 195, 208.
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particular race- or sex-based decision is part of a comprehensive integrative
effort by the employer.
1. Requiring a Micro–Macro Link: Statutory Limits and Normative
Underpinnings
Requiring a micro–macro link—a link between a race- or sex-conscious
decision and furtherance of a broader Title VII nondiscrimination goal—helps
to set some limits on employer use of race and sex in workplace decisions and
to ensure that the cost imposed on individuals for race- and sex-based
decisions actually furthers that Title VII goal. Before considering what the
micro–macro link might look like in the context of organizing work, I consider
why a micro–macro link is necessary. I have shown that the defendants in
Weber and Johnson both established such a link by identifying a manifest
imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category.178 But this does not
answer the normative question: Why should we require such a link? Or, put
another way: Does Title VII require that any race- or sex-based cost imposed
on an individual do more than avoid a single instance of discrimination?
Cognitive bias research on the influence of implicit biases and perception
of biases on decision making and interactions provides the foundation for a
good illustration of this question. The cognitive bias research suggests that
placing a black man on an otherwise all-white interview panel will reduce the
biases of the panel members and alter the context of the interaction between a
black applicant and the panel so that the panel’s decision is less likely to be
influenced by discriminatory biases.179 If the black man is assigned to the
interview panel, he may bear a cost in the form of extra work or time taken
away from tasks that would better further his career. The black man
interviewed by the panel, on the other hand, is likely to attain a benefit in the
form of a panel decision that is less likely to be influenced by discriminatory
biases. Does Title VII permit the employer to assign the black employee to the
panel as a way of reducing the likelihood that the panel’s decision will be
influenced by discriminatory bias?
In his article, Perceptual Segregation, Professor Russell Robinson answers
“yes.”180 Drawing on research showing that blacks and whites as well as
women and men tend to perceive discrimination differently and that these
178
179
180

See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Robinson, supra note 8, at 1177–79.
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differing perceptions alter interactions in ways that disadvantage blacks and
women, he argues that firms should assign a “critical mass” of black
interviewers to a committee interviewing a black candidate.181 He also argues
that firms should take similar measures in staffing committees that handle
promotion decisions and internal equal opportunity matters.182
In considering the possibility that an employer’s use of race or sex in
staffing these committees will violate Title VII, Robinson points out that
describing a decision as providing a racial or gender “preference” implies that
it favors or privileges an outsider (a woman or a person of color) and
disadvantages an insider (a man or a white person). He rightly emphasizes that
in many cases the assignment will actually “burden[] outsiders who may have
to conduct more interviews and sit on more committees than they otherwise
would.”183 Cases are also sure to arise, however, in which being a member of
the interviewing committee is prestigious or otherwise presents a valuable
opportunity to network and build social capital with important people—think
of a law faculty and the appointments committee. In those cases, the
assignment of a black man over a white man to the committee on the basis of
his race will amount at least in part to a racial “preference,” potentially
triggering a reverse discrimination claim.
Moreover, even if these assignments do consistently burden women and
minorities, never providing benefits, the law should still be concerned with
race- or sex-conscious employment decisions, probably even more so.
Robinson recognizes this point when he calls on employers “to formalize their
policies and give outsiders credit for performing this vital debiasing work.”184
But a call for credit or compensation alone is unlikely to be as effective as he
suggests. The “soft” nature of the benefits and harms associated with decisions
organizing work, after all, make it difficult to discern when an assignment to a
particular committee warrants extra credit or provides a welcome opportunity.
And one man’s opportunity may be another man’s burden.
What, then, of the equality analysis? To answer this question, it helps to
think again of the reasoning that the Third Circuit provided in Taxman for its
conclusion that Title VII permits only those race- or gender-based decisions

181

Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1170, 1173.
183 Id. at 1179.
184 Id. Similarly, I suggest the requirement that an integrative effort incorporate processes to compensate
(in a broad sensed) individuals for this work. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
182
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that are aimed at remedying past discrimination.185 According to the court,
once the antidiscrimination mandate is violated by a race- or sex-based
decision, it can only be justified by furtherance of another Title VII goal.186 “It
is only because Title VII was written to eradicate not only discrimination per
se but the consequences of prior discrimination as well,” the court explained,
“that racial preferences in the form of affirmative action can co-exist with the
Act’s antidiscrimination mandate.”187 As I argue above, this reasoning
mistakenly equates violation of the nondiscrimination mandate in isolation
with violation of the nondiscrimination mandate in total. A single sex- or racebased decision may be justified, in other words, by furtherance of a more
pervasive reduction in workplace discrimination.
A natural extension of this argument is that a race- or sex-based decision
like the one proposed by Professor Robinson188 cannot be justified by the
possibility of preventing discrimination in a single instance. Even if assigning
a black man to an interview committee reduces the likelihood that
discriminatory bias will infect the hiring decision regarding a black applicant,
using race in organizing work in that way violates Title VII if it was not
intended to (and was not likely to) further the broader antidiscrimination
goal.189 This is true whether the individual bearing a cost is the white
employee who was not assigned to the committee or the black employee who
was assigned to the committee. The importance of furthering broader Title VII
goals is even more salient, however, once we recognize that the black
employee assigned to the committee may bear a cost. In that case, the
antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII has been violated, and the goal of
reducing economic and social subordination has been undermined.
This realization reinforces the point that there must be some link between
individual race- or sex-conscious employment decisions and furtherance of
Title VII’s goals. A micro–macro link ties individual decisions to the statute’s
broader antidiscrimination goals and ensures that individual race-or sex-based
decisions are likely to further those goals. In Weber and Johnson, the link was
established by the employer’s showing of a manifest imbalance in the racial or

185

Taxman v. Twp. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1557 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
Id.
187 Id.
188 See supra text accompanying notes 181 & 182.
189 The same is true if the employer is attempting to avoid Title VII liability by assigning a black man to
the committee. See supra Part I.A.and accompanying text (discussing business reasons for taking race and sex
into account in organizing work).
186
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gender makeup of a traditionally segregated job category.190 In the next
section, I consider how an employer might establish a similar link for decisions
organizing work aimed at furthering the goal of reducing workplace
discrimination.
2. Establishing a Micro–Macro Link
Social science research teaches that attention to race and sex in decision
making will be most effective as a discrimination-reducing measure if it is
accompanied by other integrative efforts, including self-examination arising
out of attention to systemic and local demographics, structural measures aimed
at opening collaborative work opportunities, and institutional measures
facilitating democratic, peer-support norms.191 Requiring the employer to
establish a micro–macro link under Title VII by placing individual race- or
sex-based decisions within a broader integrative effort therefore serves both to
constrain race- and sex-conscious decision making (the race- or sex-based
decision must be plausibly intended to reduce workplace discrimination) and to
ensure that the decision aimed at reducing discrimination is actually likely to
do so.
a. An Integrative Effort
Although the specific contours of particular integrative efforts are likely to
vary depending on the structure and goals of the firm, research suggests that a
comprehensive integrative effort that satisfies the micro–macro link will have
three principal defining features: processes for self-assessment and regular
monitoring of systemic and local demographics and power imbalances;
organizational measures aimed at facilitating intergroup interaction; and
ongoing efforts to develop overarching norms that foster meaningful
integration. These features derive from the social science and organizational
research on conditions that moderate intergroup interaction to be stereotype
and/or bias negating rather than stereotype and/or bias confirming.
i. Self-Examination and Monitoring
Any comprehensive integrative effort should reflect a contextualized
awareness of the moderating effect of demographic balance and power
190 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 637 (1987); United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 208–09 (1979).
191 See infra notes 192–206.
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distribution on biases in interaction and decision making. Employers looking
to take race or sex into account in organizing work should be required to
undertake a diagnostic self-examination of the racial or gender equality
dynamics within their organizations and business units. They should be
required to engage in systematic quantitative and qualitative data gathering and
analysis of equality and integration conditions within their workforces.192 The
self-assessment can serve as a roadmap for integrative efforts going forward,193
but it should also provide for regular monitoring of systemic and local
demographics and power imbalances.194 The integration plan should also
designate staff and funding for carrying out the integrative effort.195 And,
importantly, it should include processes to ensure that individuals who are
asked to take on extra work as part of the integrative effort will be
appropriately compensated.196

192 This self-examination might be similar to that required of federal contractors and subcontractors under
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965), except that it would have an emphasis on
integration and equality within a workplace as well as on identifying and redressing substantial disparities
between the representation of minorities and women in the employer’s workforce and the relevant, qualified
labor pool. See generally RESKIN, supra note 65, at 10 (discussing affirmative action-related obligations
imposed on contractors and subcontractors under Executive Order 11,246).
This type of self-examination is also common in the environmental context. Professor Coglianese
provides the following description of an environmental management system (EMS):

To create an EMS, managers begin by establishing environmental goals and creating a specific
plan to achieve those goals. Managers and workers are assigned responsibilities for
implementing parts of the plan, and they are trained in what they need to carry out these
responsibilities. They keep records that document their compliance with the plan[,] and
periodically the firm (or an outside auditor) reviews these records and assesses the firm’s
performance in meeting its goals and following its internal procedures. These periodic reviews
are supposed to feed into revisions and continuous improvements in the firm’s overall system.
When auditing turns up deficiencies or problems, managers take remedial action and, as needed,
amend their plan, returning to the start of what is commonly referred to as the “plan-do-checkact” cycle.
Cary Coglianese, The Managerial Turn in Environmental Policy, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 56 (2008).
193 The self-assessment is not intended as a limit on efforts to integrate. See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing
the role of numbers).
194 William T. Bielby, Minimizing Gender and Racial Bias, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 120, 126 (2000) (citing the
importance of regular monitoring and analysis of segregation patterns in reducing workplace bias).
195 See Kalev et al., supra note 27, at 611 (finding that structures establishing responsibility lead to
increases in managerial diversity).
196 See Robinson, supra note 8, at 1179.
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ii. Other Integration-Producing and Discrimination-Reducing
Measures
An integrative effort should also include measures other than race- or sexconscious decision making that are similarly intended to foster meaningful
integration and reduce discrimination. Some of these measures will focus on
how work gets accomplished. An employer might create more team-based
work or alter its existing team-based work system to provide for more crossboundary, collaborative work opportunities.197 Depending on the degree of
functional segregation in its workforce, it might target specific job categories
for inclusion in team-based work to foster collaborative relations across
functional divisions.198 Collaborative mentoring programs can also facilitate
relationships at various levels of a hierarchy, and skills-building programs can
be reworked to foster job rotation and to provide workers with training and
experience in different jobs.199
Other measures will focus on how work is evaluated. An employer might
restructure a decision-making system or information-distribution system to
reduce the likelihood that discriminatory biases will influence decisions,200
and/or rework formal reward structures to reward dyadic rather than individual
performance.201 Research shows that structural measures like these are likely
to work in conjunction with race- and sex-consciousness in organizing work to
facilitate meaningful integration.202

197 Kalev, supra note 9, at 1603 (showing that self-directed work teams, which pull team members from
different jobs for on-going projects and have authority over their own management processes, are more
effective in increasing job success in management for women and minorities than problem-solving teams,
which tend to be composed of experts, usually white men, who come together periodically to address specific
issues).
198 The latter measure has the added potential advantage of altering the status of job categories
themselves.
199 Kalev, supra note 9, at 1627 (showing that job-rotation skills programs are more effective in
increasing job success in management than more traditional skills training programs).
200 Barbara F. Reskin & Debra Branch McBrier, Why Not Ascription? Organizations’ Employment of
Male and Female Managers, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 210, 214 (2000) (identifying formalization of personnel
procedures and increasing accountability as practices that can reduce biases in personnel decisions).
201 Shelley Brickson, The Impact of Identity Orientation on Individual and Organizational Outcomes in
Demographically Diverse Settings, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 82, 82 (2000). Laurel Smith-Doerr also identified
reward structures as a key difference between university and pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology
firms in her study of the careers of women scientists. See generally SMITH-DOERR, supra note 9.
202 See supra note 201.
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iii. Overarching Norms and Work Cultures
Research also points to the moderating effect of overarching norms and
work cultures on discrimination and segregation. In another article, I examine
work culture as a source of discrimination against historically subordinated
groups,203 but work culture can also facilitate the kind of integration that
reduces discrimination. Indeed, studies suggest that demographic diversity is
more likely to reduce discrimination in workplaces where peer-like
collaboration and supportive relations are encouraged.204 Structural measures
aimed at facilitating integrative norms should therefore be a component of any
integrative effort.
Although some of these measures will overlap with structural measures
taken to produce functional integration of work, structural changes may be
supplemented by softer ways of fostering democratic and supportive relations,
whether locally in teams, across business units, or throughout the workplace as
a whole.205 Research suggests, for example, that certain types of feedback and
consultation processes in team leadership can enhance the quality of
interpersonal relations between members of different demographic groups.206
This research is part of a growing body of quantitative and qualitative work on
the conditions that maximize the “upside” of diversity for businesses.207
Efforts instituted by employers at the policy level to foster functional
integration should operate together with the normative message sent by this
development in Title VII law to reshape the narrative regarding the relevance
of race and sex in decisions organizing work. Race and sex become relevant
under this reshaped narrative as means of fostering integration in work,
203 See generally Green, supra note 69 (describing the role that work culture plays in discrimination and
identifying ways to trigger structural changes to reshape work cultures).
204 See, e.g., Samuel B. Bacharach et al., Diversity and Homophily at Work: Supportive Relations Among
White and African-American Peers, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 619, 621 (2005); Brickson, supra note 201, at 94;
Anne S. Tsui et al., Being Different: Relational Demography and Organizational Attachment, 37 ADMIN. SCI.
Q. 549, 559 (1992); see also ESTLUND, supra note 160, at 50–54 (describing the idea of “social capitalism” and
the role of layout and architecture in advancing egalitarian norms).
205 See Bacharach et al., supra note 204, at 639. See generally Joyce Rothschild, Creating a Just and
Democratic Workplace: More Engagement, Less Hierarchy, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 195 (2000) (urging
democratic practices as a way of capturing the potential of the move toward team-based work).
206 See Ruth Wageman, How Leaders Foster Self-Managing Team Effectiveness: Design Choices Versus
Hands-On Coaching, 12 ORG. SCI. 559 (2001).
207 See, e.g., Brickson, supra note 201, at 96 (discussing the importance of identifying conditions under
which organizations would be better positioned to “maximize the upside and minimize the downside of
diversity”). More generally, some of the business literature on ways of developing corporate culture may also
be useful, though it should be viewed critically. See Green, supra note 69.
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integration that will reduce stereotyping and biases in interaction, even as
consideration of race and sex may simultaneously serve the “diversity”
business interests that are dominant in the prevailing narrative.208 Individual
decision makers assigning work, assembling work teams, recruiting employees
for publicity work, etc., will be conscious of race and sex under this reshaped
narrative, but they will not view membership in racial or gender groups as
evidence of particular viewpoints or work capacities.
b. The Role of Numbers
Given the emphasis on numbers in Weber and Johnson, courts and scholars
alike tend to assume that any consideration of race or sex in workplace
decision making will require a particular numerical disparity to establish the
micro–macro link. The majority in Taxman provides the most obvious
example, restricting consideration of race and sex to decisions intended to
remedy a “manifest imbalance.” But progressive legal scholars who see the
possibility of non-remedial justifications for race- or sex-based decision
making also seem unwilling to imagine an analysis that does not require
employers to show a particular numerical disparity in order to take race or sex
into account. Professor Estlund, for example, argues that Grutter opens Title
VII to non-remedial justifications for race- or sex-conscious decision making,
but she adopts the “manifest imbalance” requirement of Johnson.209 Professor
Yelnosky also carries over a numbers-based requirement into his proposed
analysis of the non-remedial, prevention justification for race- and sex-based
preferences in hiring, although he relaxes the requirement somewhat.210 After
arguing persuasively that Johnson’s manifest imbalance requirement “may not
apply to prevention plans,” Yelnosky proposes a requirement that “the
employer . . . show an imbalance in the gender [or racial] make-up of the
workforce.”211 Neither Estlund nor Yelnosky explain why they think that
employers should be required to make a showing similar to that in Johnson
when the goal being served is reducing future discrimination (or, in Estlund’s

208 For more discussion of the narrative that this development of Title VII law has the potential to create,
see Part III.B.
209 Estlund, supra note 10, at 35–36 (noting that “Grutter’s recognition of the civic and societal value of
integrated institutions provides ample reason for choosing the more accommodating reading” of Johnson,
specifically that “[e]mployers need not cite any particular reasons for addressing a ‘manifest imbalance’ in a
predominately white workplace or job; it is enough that the ‘manifest imbalance’ exists”).
210 Yelnosky, supra note 12.
211 Id. at 1417–19.
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view, advancing social democracy) rather than eliminating the effects of past
discrimination.
While numbers—or, more accurately, the racial or gender demographics of
a workforce, division, or work group—are as Estlund puts it “inescapably
relevant” to any functional integrative effort,212 employers should not be
required to point to any particular numerical imbalance to establish the Title
VII micro–macro link. On the contrary, an employer’s showing that its
individual race- or sex-conscious decisions are part of a broader integrative
effort serves the same purpose for the non-remedial justification of reducing
discrimination as an employer’s showing of a manifest imbalance serves for
the remedial justification. This showing ensures that the individual decision is
linked to the broader Title VII goal in a way that makes it likely that the raceor sex-based decision is furthering that goal. Because the goal in this context
is different—reducing future discrimination rather than removing the effects of
past discrimination—so too should be the showing required for the micro–
macro link.
Several practical reasons also exist for rejecting the requirement of a
numbers-based showing for race- or sex-conscious decisions in organizing
work. First, reducing discrimination through integration requires attention to
demographics at multiple levels within an organization. An employer should
be simultaneously seeking to integrate work groups, break down stratification
across work divisions, and integrate the workforce as a whole. It does not
make sense, therefore, to restrict an employer’s effort to a single,
demographically unbalanced business unit or job category.
Second, considering race or sex in organizing work can further the goal of
reducing discrimination in a variety of ways. Requiring that each individual
decision be part of a broader integrative effort cabins employer discretion in
making race or sex-conscious decisions at the same time that it allows
employer flexibility. Employers may want to consider race or sex in
developing publicity materials, for example, to portray the firm as diverse.
Research shows that honoring members of different groups and portraying
them positively helps foster cultures valuing diversity,213 but a single decision

212 Estlund, supra note 10, at 37. Indeed, the call for an integrative effort recognizes that race and sex
trigger stereotypes and biases and that demographics and power are key moderators of bias and prejudice.
213 See, e.g., HARRISON M. TRICE & JANICE M. BEYER, THE CULTURES OF WORK ORGANIZATIONS (1993);
Jennifer A. Chatman et al., Being Different yet Feeling Similar: The Influence of Demographic Composition
and Organizational Culture on Work Processes and Outcomes, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 749, 777 (1998).
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to feature a black woman in a television interview, particularly if the interview
or the fact of the interview is not disseminated within the workplace, is
unlikely to accomplish the goal of reducing discrimination. Information about
the interview needs to be disseminated to the workforce, and the decision to
feature the black woman needs to be part of a larger effort to integrate and to
create norms that value diversity and integration.
It is possible that Professors Yelnosky and Estlund propose a requirement
of demographic underrepresentation (whether as compared with another job
within the employer’s workforce or as compared with a relevant labor pool)
because the underrepresentation serves as a short-hand, a signal that
discrimination is likely operating in a particular workplace.214 If we take the
social science research outlined in Part I seriously, though, we should need no
such organization-specific demonstration, even a short-hand one. Unless the
organization is so demographically diverse across all sectors of its workforce
that work teams and decision-making committees formed entirely without
regard to race or sex would be sufficiently diverse as to create stereotype- and
bias-negating rather than stereotype- and bias-facilitating interactions, then
race- and sex-conscious decisions organizing work—when made as part of a
broader integrative effort—will serve the goal of reducing discrimination in the
workplace. Such a level of diversity will be very rare, particularly given the
current demographic makeup of the American workforce. Moreover, race- and
sex-based decisions organizing work may still serve the goal of reducing future
discrimination even in such a demographically balanced workplace.215
Numbers, of course, will not be irrelevant to the question of whether the
employer has established the necessary micro–macro link. If Latino
employees are concentrated in a particular division within a firm, for example,
then it would be difficult for the employer to show that the decision to assign a

214 Yelnosky, supra note 12, at 1418 (“The focus would then shift to the presence of small numbers of
women in the job in question, which would put them at special risk of discrimination.”). Professor Estlund, in
contrast, seems to require a showing of a “‘manifest imbalance’ in a predominately white workplace or job” as
a way of making it more likely that race- or sex-based decisions will be “pro-integration.” Estlund, supra note
10, at 35–36. At the level of organizing work, however, numbers cannot establish the necessary link between
using race and sex in individual decisions and advancing integration. See supra Part I.A.
215 Substantial change in the prevalence of underlying discriminatory biases and stereotypes would be
required to warrant a shift in the legality of race- and sex-based decisions organizing work as a discriminationreducing measure. Professors Kang and Banaji make a similar point. See Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at
1116 (“Fair measures that are race- or gender-conscious will become presumptively unnecessary when the
nation’s implicit bias against those social categories goes to zero or its negligible behavioral equivalent.”
(footnote omitted)).
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Latino worker to that division was part of an integrative effort. Indeed, this is
one way in which applying this interpretation of Title VII to decisions
organizing work will refocus attention to the systemic instead of the individual
level.216
Nor should numbers be irrelevant. One of the benefits of an integration
approach to race and sex in organizing work under Title VII is its emphasis on
the role of numbers in understanding discrimination and inequality in the
workplace. An integration approach brings self-examination of parity and
demographics back to the forefront of antidiscrimination law. To be permitted
to use race and sex in decisions organizing work, employers must not only
monitor demographics; they must identify the obstacles to equality and take
efforts to change the structures and social practices that entrench segregation
and discrimination in their workplaces.
III. POSSIBILITIES AND CONCERNS
Applying an integration approach to race and sex in organizing work under
Title VII presents an untapped opportunity to advance workplace equality.
Because decisions organizing work are “softer” than decisions about whom to
hire, fire, or promote, both in the multi-factored, discretionary nature of their
decision-making processes and in the discernability and immediacy of their
benefits and harms, considering race and sex in organizing work—as guided
by Title VII—may prove a more effective tool for reducing discrimination and
advancing equality than considering race and sex in decisions regarding
precise points of entry, exit, or advancement.217 Not only is permitting
consideration of race and sex in organizing work likely to attain greater
normative traction than traditional affirmative action efforts, but by harnessing
216

See supra note 13 (describing the move toward regulatory focus on structures and systems over the ex
post facto identification of specific instances of discrimination).
217 Because the immediate harms and benefits of decisions organizing work are often softer than the
harms and benefits of decisions at hiring, promotion, or discharge, considering race and sex in organizing work
is also unlikely to trammel the interests of members of any particular group. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480
U.S. 616, 630 (1987) (holding that the use of race or sex under Title VII is not permitted to “trammel the
interests” of others (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)). In Weber, the
Court explained that the plan there did not “unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees”
because it did not require “the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees” or
create “an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees.” Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. Considering race or
sex in organizing work as one factor in determining which employees to place on a particular work team—
even if, for example, the decision is shown to cause harm by affecting opportunities for job tasks and
relationships—is unlikely to tread upon entitlements, result in quotas, or provide the immediate impetus for
discharge.
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business interests at the policy level within organizations, Title VII is capable
of generating a new narrative that couples structural reform to day-to-day
social practices. Developing a comprehensive analysis of Title VII as it
applies to decisions organizing work can help push organizations to
incorporate integration in work into their diversity programs.
A. Practical Concerns
I anticipate several concerns about the practical effects of the proposed
interpretation of Title VII. This interpretation pushes Title VII in a new
regulatory direction. Instead of mandating or prohibiting specific structures for
all employers or requiring that certain outcomes such as specific demographic
balances or disparities be achieved or avoided, this proposal propels Title VII
into the realm of management-based regulation. It focuses regulatory attention
on employers’ self-examination processes and on their efforts to instill a
variety of integration-advancing organizational and management structures.218
Moreover, because tying individual race- and sex-based decisions organizing
work to a broader integrative effort would serve as a justification for race- and
sex-based decision making, the proposed development of Title VII is likely to
have an impact on the ability of plaintiffs to obtain judgments of liability in
this area.
The most immediate concern raised by my interpretation of Title VII stems
from the need for judicial monitoring of organizational decisions. The idea
here is that courts cannot (or will not) adequately monitor employers’
integrative efforts. Instead, courts will defer to employers, irrespective of the
effectiveness of the measures being implemented, and employers will fill the
regulatory gaps with measures that have little to no effect on workplace
equality.219 Professor Lauren Edelman’s research on the endogeneity of law
218 In the employment discrimination context, this approach to regulation has been most commonly called
a “problem-solving approach.” See Sturm, supra note 99, at 484. I use the term “management-based” here in
an effort to better capture the role of regulatory oversight in this approach. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer,
Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 691 (2003) (examining use of management-based regulatory strategy in areas of food safety, industrial
safety, and environmental protection). According to Professors Coglianese and Lazer, a management-based
regulatory instrument is defined by its focus on regulating firms’ planning processes and efforts at achieving
specific public goals. Id. at 692.
219 See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 523 (2003). For discussion of this and other challenges faced by efforts to address
discrimination in employment through a reframing of the nondiscrimination obligation, see Tristin K. Green,
Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659 (2003).
This concern is common to all management-based regulatory systems. For a discussion of the monitoring
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provides support for this concern.220 Her research shows that judges over time
have tended to view institutionalized organizational structures—those that
have become commonly adopted across organizations—as indicators of
nondiscrimination even if those structures do little to reduce discrimination.221
Moreover, it appears that judges are more likely to defer to these
institutionalized structures when they are asked to review organizational
attributes that are not directly observable.222
One way of reducing the difficulties associated with judicial review of
integrative efforts might be to carve a greater role for agencies and/or private
entities in overseeing and devising integrative efforts.223 Much as the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Program (OFCCP) monitors federal contractors’
affirmative action efforts through compliance reviews,224 a government agency
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission could monitor
integrative efforts. Firms seeking to undertake race- and sex-conscious
decisions organizing work might engage with social scientists and other
experts employed by the EEOC to develop and provide evidence of integrative
efforts. Private, third-party auditors might also serve as monitors.225
The concern about judicial willingness may also hold somewhat less
weight in this context because of the courts’ long history of examining
affirmative action plans to determine whether they were adopted for a
problem across substantive areas of law that draws parallels to delegation of decision making to administrative
agencies, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decision Making, and
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377 (2006). In the employment discrimination
context, Professor Susan Sturm provides the most sophisticated account of possible solutions to monitoring
difficulties generated by “problem-solving” approaches to regulation. See, e.g., Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm,
Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565 (2007)
(exploring a new role for courts in management-based regulation); Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion:
Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247 (2006) (using a case study as
a springboard for exploring the role of institutional intermediaries in monitoring change).
220 Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational
Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406 (1999); see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and
Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1999); Lauren B.
Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the
American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401 (1990) (discussing the role of personnel professionals in diffusing
organizational compliance mechanisms).
221 Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 220.
222 See id.
223 Coglianese, supra note 192.
224 RESKIN, supra note 65, at 11.
225 The Environmental Protection Agency has experimented with the use of private auditors in the
environmental context. See Howard C. Kunreuther et al., Third-Party Inspection as an Alternative to
Command and Control Regulation, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 309, 316–317 (2002).
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permissible purpose and whether they are likely to further that purpose.
Indeed, one of the benefits of undertaking a management-based strategy as part
of a justification of the voluntary use of race and sex in organizing work lies in
its posture as a voluntary effort.226 Because the law provides a justification for
using race and sex, rather than interpreting the law’s initial prohibition on
discrimination (as all other proposals advocating a move toward organizational
reform to date have done), it provides space for experimentation. If empirical
work shows that courts (or other monitors) are doing an inadequate job of
monitoring, then Congress can amend Title VII to provide for a different
means of monitoring or even so that it no longer permits any consideration of
race or sex in organizing work.
Apart from the monitoring difficulty, there is also a risk that applying an
integration approach under Title VII to race and sex in organizing work will be
counter-productive, providing employers with a ready-made escape hatch to
existing, sometimes successful, efforts to hold employers liable for
discriminatory biases in organizing work. Take, for example, the class action
lawsuit against American Express.227 The plaintiffs alleged that women
suffered pay discrimination because discriminatory bias played a role in
assignments to lucrative clients.228 American Express used an informal system
of choosing “superstars” from incoming recruits and assigned its best, most
lucrative accounts to those employees.229 The assignment of clients is likely a
decision organizing work; the assignments did not directly determine the
employee’s pay and, therefore, would not themselves be considered adverse
employment actions. Does applying an integration approach to these decisions
offer employers a way out of liability? Could American Express have
successfully argued, in other words, that it considered sex in assigning work as
part of a broader integrative effort aimed at reducing discrimination? I think
not, and this brings us back to the role of numbers in establishing the requisite
micro–macro link. If women as a group are generally assigned the less
prestigious and less lucrative clients, then employers should find it difficult to
persuade a fact finder that these assignments were part of an integrative effort
226 There is reason to believe that a management-based strategy will be more effective when it is
associated with voluntary rather than mandated action on fronts that are currently not being regulated. See
generally Coglianese, supra note 192, at 69 (noting that in the environmental context, management strategies
may be more effective in unregulated areas). This is one of the added benefits of the interpretation of Title VII
proposed in this Article: Employers will have an incentive to undertake integrative measures voluntarily.
227 Complaint, Kosen v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 1:02-CV0082 (D.D.C. June 17, 2002).
228 Id. at 10.
229 Id. at 11.
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aimed at reducing discrimination. That said, it is possible that a fact finder
would find for the defendant (or would defer to the employer’s assertion that it
was seeking to reduce discrimination). The risk seems no higher, however,
than the risk that a fact finder would accept the employer’s argument that
discrimination should not be inferred from stratification/segregation statistics
because the employer was otherwise concerned about the job success of
women in its workplace.230
The impact on individual lawsuits is likely to be more substantial. Unless
an individual has evidence of discriminatory animus or bias on the part of a
decision maker or evidence of a pattern of assignment that is inconsistent with
an integrative effort, she may lose her claim to the employer’s argument that it
did take her race into account in assigning work but that it did so as part of its
broader integrative effort. Potential plaintiffs with comparative evidence, for
example, may find another hurdle to success in a claim of individual disparate
treatment. Similarly, the woman who is asked to do extra work because of her
sex and is not compensated for that work may lose her claim of individual
disparate treatment when the employer shows that it asked her to do that work
as part of a broader integrative effort that includes processes to ensure
compensation for that work.231 These are real costs of the interpretation of
Title VII that I advance, but the costs should be outweighed by the benefits
obtained by refocusing Title VII on structures and systems and by reshaping
the narrative regarding the relevance of race and sex in organizing work to
serve the goals of integration and reduced discrimination at work.232
Finally, one might question whether this approach asks too much of
businesses that are sincerely committed to equality and nondiscrimination. It
is not unheard of, for example, for a law school’s deans to put more pressure
on its women faculty and faculty of color than on its white, male faculty to
attend weekend admission events and student recruitment dinners. Deans may
do this with the laudable aim of attracting a more diverse student body. Under
my proposal, even if the law school is otherwise committed to having a diverse
faculty and takes measures to attain and retain a diverse faculty, it will still

230 See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 319–322 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding the
district court’s finding that an underrepresentation of women in commission jobs was due to women’s lack of
interest and not due to discrimination within the organization).
231 See supra note 196 and accompanying text (requiring procedures to compensate women and minorities
for additional work).
232 Indeed, only if the justification actually protects employers against liability in some cases will
employers be motivated to undertake the integrative effort.
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have to show that it has undertaken a broad integrative effort and that the
decision to showcase women and faculty of color to students is part of that
effort. This requirement could impose substantial costs associated with
undertaking an integrative effort on the organization, and may even result in
the hiring of one fewer faculty member (maybe even one fewer woman and/or
person of color) for lack of funds. Is the benefit worth the cost? In some
individual cases, the answer may be “no,” but in the general run of cases—at
the level of policy making—I think the answer will be “yes.” Requiring an
integrative effort forces even well-meaning institutions to take stock of
demographics and power differentials, at least if they want to take race or sex
into account in organizing work.
Some institutions will decide that the cost is too high, in which case they
may make more of an effort to protect against discriminatory biases in
organizing work. Indeed, even if most employers decide based on this
interpretation of Title VII that they will not allow consideration of race or sex
in organizing work, the effect of the law is still likely to be positive. If race
and sex are currently being used as a signal—internally and externally—that
all is equal and nondiscriminatory within work organizations, then
transparency itself may be useful. Either way, whether by harnessing business
interests or forcing transparency, the law will have triggered an important,
forward-looking inquiry into the use of race and sex in decision making and
discrimination at the level of organizing work.
B. The Effect of a New Narrative
It is also important to think carefully about the effect of the reframed
narrative regarding the relevance of race and sex to decisions organizing work
on broader social equality goals. This narrative has the potential to
dramatically alter the context of intergroup interactions at work and,
accordingly, to redirect the construction of race and sex in work, but it also
carries with it some risks.
Any use of race or sex in employment decision making carries with it a risk
that the perceived beneficiary of the decision will be cast as undeserving.
Studies show that when the perceived beneficiary casts herself as undeserving,
she can suffer from an internal sense of stigma and self-doubt that can translate
to lower motivation and commitment and less ambitious task selection.233

233

Krieger, supra note 140, at 1264–70.
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When others cast her as undeserving, moreover, they are likely to assume that
she is less capable and are more likely to engage in stereotyping.234 The
research also shows, however, that the self-derogation effects of the use of race
or sex in decision making tend to disappear when subjects are told that
qualifications as well as group membership were used in making selections.235
Race and sex in organizing work, guided by Title VII, should be part of an
employer’s broad pronouncement that race and sex may be considered as one
factor in otherwise complex and multi-factored, discretionary decisions about
the organization of work and work tasks. To the extent that qualifications
rather than group membership take center stage in making these decisions, the
risks of taking race and sex into account should be reduced substantially.
Relatedly, consideration of race and sex in organizing work is less likely to
generate perceptions of unfairness than consideration of those characteristics at
points of entry, exit, or promotion.236 Again, because decisions organizing
work are typically multi-factored and discretionary, the use of race or sex as a
factor in these decisions is less likely to be viewed as antithetical to the meritbased norm.
There remains some risk, nonetheless, that considering race and sex in
organizing work will reinforce stereotypic assumptions about outgroup
inferiority by providing a plausible situational attribution for the job successes
of women and minorities. Employees will not know when race played a role;
they may assume that it always plays a role. Indeed, research suggests that
they are likely to assume that it played a role more often when women or
minorities are placed in positions of power or prestige than when white men
are placed in those positions.237 Some risk of stereotype-reinforcing
assumptions is attendant to all uses of race and sex in decision making, and
using race and sex in organizing work is no exception.
Based in part on this reality, I expect some commentators will object to the
Title VII analysis presented here on the ground that it permits classification on
the basis of protected factors at all. Any race- or sex-based classification, this
234

Id.
Id.; see also Brenda Major et al., Attributional Ambiguity of Affirmative Action, 15 BASIC & APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 119 (1994) (“[I]f a beneficiary is confident that he or she deserves a position . . . selection
policies emphasizing group membership will not be detrimental to his or her self-evaluations.”).
236 See Rothschild, supra note 205 (discussing organizational practices in the workplace); see also
Krieger, supra note 140, at 1271–72 (describing the role of perceived fairness in resistance to affirmative
action programs).
237 Krieger, supra note 140, at 1264–70 (describing research in this area).
235
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argument goes, perpetuates stereotyping and exacerbates intergroup tensions.
These commentators would argue that instead of permitting consideration of
race or sex under any circumstances, we should strive to ignore race and sex in
all employment decisions.
While it is true that making intergroup differences salient can exacerbate
stereotyping and bias (and for that reason an integrative effort should include
efforts to foster a climate of peer-like collaboration and supportive relations),
an integration approach to considering race and sex in organizing work serves
to protect against stereotyping by deemphasizing diversity as group-based
difference. Managers who organize work are not permitted under this
approach to take race or sex into account based on their assumptions about
how members of particular racial or gender groups will behave or what they
will contribute as members of those groups. Rather, the narrative as reframed
by the proposed interpretation of Title VII emphasizes the benefits of
integration to the business and to all workers.
One of the greatest strengths of the proposed interpretation of Title VII law
may be its potential to reframe the narrative regarding the relevance of race
and sex in organizing work and, ultimately, our perceptions about the
relevance of race and sex to work.238 As this Article demonstrates, race and
sex already influence decisions organizing work. Most workers now are likely
to assume that race and sex are relevant only for decisions involving women
and people of color (and that they are relevant only as serving or signaling
devices). Title VII has the potential to reframe the diversity narrative so that
race and sex are relevant (and perceived as relevant) for all workers. If
workers begin to assume that race and sex often play some role, even a very
minor one, in decisions organizing work, maybe that will dampen the sense
that race matters in some decisions but not others. This could be the beginning
of a new diversity narrative under which race and sex are relevant as means of
creating opportunities for positive intergroup contact that will benefit workers
as well as the firms for which they work.239

238 See generally Ellen C. Berrey, How Diversity Excludes: Organizational Diversity Rhetoric and
Programs in Three U.S. Field Sites (May 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (highlighting the
importance of probing organizational meaning-making for racial equality).
239 See Thomas & Ely, supra note 26, at 260 (presenting research suggesting that an “integration-andlearning” diversity perspective leads to better work group functioning than other perspectives).
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CONCLUSION
This Article exposes the risks and possibilities of the conscious use of race
and sex in organizing work and presents a new way for Title VII to trigger
structural changes as well as individual race- and sex-based decisions that are
likely to increase functional integration and reduce workplace discrimination.
Without such a comprehensive approach, the use of race and sex in organizing
work is likely to result in increased discrimination and entrenched inequality.
The interpretation of Title VII presented here offers an opportunity for
businesses to attain the bottom-line benefits associated with cross-cultural
competence and reduced discrimination at the same time that those businesses
advance the nation’s social justice interests.
This Article also exposes important lines of future empirical research that
could inform deliberations about whether and how the law is working to serve
its goals. This research may show, for example, that courts or other
monitoring actors are not adequately monitoring organizational efforts, or that
the costs placed on individual women and minorities by race- and sex-based
decisions organizing work are contributing to broader group-based
subordination and inequality in work. Either of these findings might affect the
balance between private and public monitors, the precise contours of
regulatory requirements, or even the undertaking itself. Because the law
developed here identifies a justification for race- and sex-based decision
making, policy makers should be particularly receptive to evidence that the
justification is either directly ineffective or that its indirect effects are taking
antidiscrimination law or norms astray.
More broadly, this Article attends to relations in employment
discrimination law. It focuses attention on the role that social interactions play
in producing and reproducing disadvantage at work and on the role of
organizational and institutional structures both in enabling and shaping biased
interactions and in generating meaningful interventions for reform. In doing
so, it pushes us to think more concretely about contextual influences not just
on individual mindsets but also on the social interactions through which the
contemporary dynamics of race and sex are carried out.

